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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the nexus that has evolved between 
terrorism and the illicit drug trade, threatening the 
sovereignty of countless nations worldwide.  The 
“narcoterrorist” nexus is becoming ever more apparent as 
the transnational link between narcotics trafficking and 
terrorism has coerced Mexico into an on-going struggle for 
survival against powerful drug cartels that are ravaging 
the region.  Does narcoterrorism pose a clear and present 
danger to America’s national security?  Is the current U.S. 
strategy to prosecute it effective?  Moreover, are there 
any lessons that can be derived from the Latin American and 
Eurasian examples that would afford added insight into this 
phenomenon and assist U.S. policymaking efforts?   
This thesis endeavors to answer these questions 
through an investigation of two areas of study.  First, an 
examination of the concepts and historical context 
associated with the nature of narcoterrorism are presented, 
highlighting numerous issues within the lexicon.  Second, 
to ascertain if previous efforts can offer beneficial 
perspectives in confronting the current narcoterrorist 
threat, two in-depth case studies concerning Turkey and 
Columbia are accomplished.  These two components, when 
combined, offer valuable lessons learned and potential 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The events of September 11, 2001, graphically 
illustrate the need to starve the infrastructure 
of every global terrorist organization and 
deprive them of the drug proceeds that might 
otherwise be used to fund acts of terror.1 
—Statement of Asa Hutchinson, Administrator, 
Drug Enforcement Administration on March 13, 
2002 before the United States Senate 
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on 
Technology, Terrorism, and Government 
Information. 
 
This thesis will examine the narcoterrorist nexus that 
has, for many years, threatened the sovereignty of 
countless countries in Latin America and Eurasia.  The same 
illegal drug production funds that attack civilized society 
also destabilize democracies across the globe.  The 
international connection between drugs and terrorism is now 
threatening the security of the United States.  Due to the 
ongoing struggle for power and supremacy among Mexico’s 
drug cartels, drug-related deaths and violence near the 
U.S.-Mexican border are accelerating with alarming 
regularity.  The threat of a spillover onto U.S. soil 
encumbers the crisis as an issue for homeland security.  
Does narcoterrorism pose a clear and present danger to 
America’s national security?  Moreover, is the current 
United States strategy to prosecute it effective?  It is 
                     
1 Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, 
and Government Information, Drug Enforcement Administration 
Congressional Testimony: Executive Summary, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 
2003,  http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031302p.html 
(accessed May 24, 2010).  
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apparent that the U.S. government is making strides to 
address this issue of global significance; however, is 
enough being done to combat this threat?  In addition, can 
any lessons be derived from the Latin American and Eurasian 
examples that would facilitate a more coherent 
understanding of this phenomenon and assist U.S. 
policymaking efforts?   
In order to assess the legitimacy of the posed 
research question and understand the scope of the issue, it 
is necessary to divide the research into two areas of 
study:  an investigation of several fundamental concepts 
dealing with the nature and character of narcoterrorism, 
and in-depth case studies involving two countries with 
first-hand experience in dealing with terrorism and the 
connection to the illicit drug trade.  The fundamental 
concepts will consider narcoterrorism’s connection to the 
war on drugs and the war on terror, and the current U.S. 
policies and practices implemented to combat the threat.  
The in-depth case studies will focus on the countries of 
Colombia and Turkey to ascertain if there are any lessons 
that can be considered as part of America’s overall 
strategy to counter this threat.  Colombia was chosen as an 
area of interest due to its “importance as a key source 
country for the coca leaf and as an incubator for organized 
crime.”2  Turkey was also found to be an area of 
significance since, unlike many nations, its government has 
done a much better job of responding to the narcoterrorist 
                     
2 Patricia Bibes, "Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: 
Colombia, a Case Study," Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 17, 
no. 3 (August 1, 2001), 243, 
http://ccj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/3/243 (accessed May 28, 
2010). 
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threat by linking organized crime, the drug trade, and 
terrorist organizations together.3  Both countries are also 
characterized by a lengthy and checkered past in 
confronting this palpable menace to democratic stability 
and reform.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the law enforcement 
community typically dealt with drug trafficking and 
terrorist activities as two separate issues.4  In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York City, 
Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, these two criminal 
activities became inextricably entwined.  The events of 
September 11 have brought new focus to an old problem, 
narcoterrorism.5  In attempting to combat this threat, the 
link between drugs and terrorism has been thrust into the 
spotlight once again.  Whether it is a state or a 
narcoterrorist organization, the connection between drugs 
and terrorism is dangerously apparent.6  Investigating the 
link between drugs and terrorism has taken on renewed  
 
                     
3 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as a 
Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case 
Study," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10 (October, 2007), 
907-909, 
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&hid=15&sid=104
4a0e2-0863-457a-85d6-7949cdb8744d%40sessionmgr10 (accessed May 28, 
2010). 
4 Senate Judiciary Committee, Committee on the Judiciary, Narco-
Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism - A Dangerous 
Mix, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, 103, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/narco_terror_20may03.pdf 
(accessed May 24, 2010). 
5 Kimberley L. Thachuk, ed., Transnational Threats: Smuggling and 
Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life (Westport, Conn.: Praeger 
Security International, 2007), 25-26.  
6 Ibid. 
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significance and has heightened the visibility of the 
threat that was present even before the events of September 
11. 
Globalization has radically changed the nature of both 
legitimate and illegitimate ventures.7  Criminals, by 
exploiting advances in technology, finance, communications, 
and transportation in pursuit of their illegal enterprises, 
have become criminal entrepreneurs, fusing drugs and 
terrorism together in an elaborate labyrinth of illicit 
activities.  Not only is the proliferation of illegal drugs 
perceived as a danger, but the profits from the sale of 
drugs provide a ready source of funding for other criminal 
activities, including terrorism. 
The international narcotics industry represents a very 
lucrative and highly problematic illicit endeavor.  
According to the 2009 Congressional Research Service report 
entitled “International Drug Control Policy,” “Estimates of 
the global proceeds from illegal drugs vary significantly, 
ranging from $100 billion to more than $1 trillion per 
year.”8  Moreover, the connection of this highly profitable 
criminal enterprise to terrorist organizations is not 
difficult to envision since,  
                     
7 Michaelene Cox, State of Corruption, State of Chaos: The Terror of 
Political Malfeasance (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 15.  
8 Liana Sun Wyler, International Drug Control Policy Congressional 
Research Service [2010]), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34543.pdf 
(accessed May 14, 2010). 
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The global drug trade yields such a staggering 
amount of money that it is not hard to 
contemplate how some may illicitly flow into the 
coffers of some terrorists.9   
Tracking and intercepting the unlawful flow of drug 
money is an important tool in identifying and dismantling 
international drug trafficking organizations with ties to 
terrorism since terrorist groups, in need of new sources of 
funds, are turning increasingly to narcotics syndicates and 
avenues of organized crime.  This phenomenon can be 
attributed to the decline in the state sponsorship of 
terrorist activities, thanks to a concerted international 
effort to starve the financial base of every terrorist 
organization and deprive them of revenue that is used to 
fund acts of terror and the successful disruption of 
terrorist communication nodes by the United States and its 
allies.10 
The significance of the threat created by 
narcoterrorism was underscored by President Obama in his 
message delivered at the Opening of the Trans-Pacific 
Symposium on November 9, 2009: 
In recent years, the world has seen a convergence 
of transnational threats and networks, which are 
more dangerous and destabilizing than ever.  
                     
9 David M. Luna, "Narco-Trafficking: What is the Nexus with the War 
on Terror?" (Lecture on The Whole of Government Approach – Applying 
Full Spectrum Capabilities in Dismantling Transnational Illicit 
Networks and Corruption Nodes in the Crime-Terror Continuum in Miami, 
FL, U.S. Department of State Website, October 8, 2008,  
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/110828.htm (accessed May 3, 2010). 
10 Michael Braun, "Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist 
Groups: A Growing Nexus?" (Special Policy Forum at The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC, The Washington 
Institute, July 25, 2008 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2914 (accessed 
May 26, 2010). 
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These threats and networks are becoming more 
fluid and sophisticated; are able to cross 
borders; and involve elements of international 
organized crime, particularly illicit finance and 
trafficking in drugs, arms and persons.  This can 
undermine stability and security, fuel violence 
and corruption, weaken the rule of law, and 
subvert legitimate economies.  Addressing these 
21st century transnational threats is an important 
priority of the United States.11 
Narcoterrorism and its corrosive effects represent a 
devastating and surreptitious assault on the United States 
and democratic nations spanning the globe.  How serious is 
the danger posed by the intersection of drugs and 
terrorism?  The same factors have already affected 
Colombia, and have destabilized Peru, Mexico, and 
Afghanistan, to name but a few.12  Ignoring the 
narcoterrorist threat and the corruption it spreads could 
have dire consequences for the security of not only the 
United States but also of democratic nations around the 
world. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The basic problem that surfaces as a result of the 
research question being posed is that if narcoterrorism 
embodies such a clear and present danger to America’s 
national security, is the current U.S. strategy to combat 
                     
11 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, "Chair's Report: Trans-Pacific Symposium on 
Dismantling Transnational Illicit Networks" (Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. 
Department of State, November 9-12, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/137311.htm (accessed May 5, 2010). 
12 Asa Hutchinson, "Narco-Terror: The International Connection 
between Drugs and Terror" (Heritage Foundation Institute for 
International Studies, Washington DC, April 2, 2002), 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/speeches/s040202.html (accessed May 28, 
2010). 
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it sufficient?  Is America doing enough to impede its 
devastating consequences?  Moreover, are there any lessons 
that can be obtained from the analysis of other nations’ 
attempts to eradicate this transnational threat? 
The startling reality is that the extensive continuum 
of narcoterrorist activity, which includes smuggling and 
trafficking offenses, directly impacts U.S. national 
security because of the influence it has on worldwide 
stability and its ability to undermine global trade, 
industry and financial markets.13  Top intelligence and 
national security experts have deliberated the merits and 
shortcomings of various strategies the U.S. has adopted to 
defeat this remerging threat, which is shaped by the 
“transformation” and “convergence” of large-scale global 
criminal networks and terrorist organizations.  As Thomas 
Sanderson observed in an article pertaining to the link 
between terrorism and organized crime, 
While there is some debate as to whether these 
groups are ‘converging’ or ‘transforming,’ it is 
clear that this growing threat is complex and 
increasingly difficult to counter with standard 
law enforcement and military counter-measures.14 
My hypothesis is that narcoterrorism does in fact 
represent a clear and present danger to America’s national 
security. The perceived effectiveness of the 
                     
13 Mark A. R. Kleiman, Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal 
Links and Implications for Domestic Drug Control Policy (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service [2004]), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=40076&coll=documents (accessed May 31, 
2008). 
14 Thomas M. Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: 
Blurring the Lines," The SAIS Review of International Affairs 24, no. 1 
(Winter-Spring 2004), 49, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v024/24.1sanderson.pdf 
(accessed May 5, 2010). 
 8
countermeasures utilized to combat its deadly effects 
should be scrutinized with renewed intensity since 
traditional law enforcement and military practices seem to 
be falling far short of dealing with this endemic problem.  
The sheer magnitude of narcoterrorism’s reach and the 
global ramifications, if unchecked, point to valuable 
lessons that can be gleaned from other nations’ efforts to 
confront this transnational scourge.  Of the major drug-
producing nations in Latin America, the case of Colombia 
yields an excellent illustration of both the effectiveness 
and failure in political leadership, military and police 
involvement to counter the narcoterrorist threat.  Its 
efforts in dealing with the illegal drug trade and the 
insurgent challenge provide a wealth of lessons and data to 
review and study.  Many important lessons can also be 
derived from the case of Turkey, which has had extensive 
experience in dealing with the issue of narcoterrorism due 
to its geopolitical and geostrategic position.  Grasping 
the relationship between the illegal drug trade and the 
financing of violence has been an important guiding 
principle of the Turkish counterterrorism policy.15 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of published materials relevant to this 
thesis includes numerous studies, reports and literature 
produced in the form of government reports, Congressional 
testimony, journal articles, and scholarly books. 
                     
15 Alexander Yonah, Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 291-292. 
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1. Areas of Scholarly Debate 
One of the recurring themes throughout the body of 
literature surveyed is that there are many problems 
associated with defining a clear strategy to defeat the 
narcoterrorist threat.  This arises from the fact that 
there is much debate among pundits as to the true meaning 
of the threat, the extent of the danger, and what measures 
are necessary to formulate a successful policy approach. 
The term “narcoterrorism” has a myriad of definitions 
and connotations that are subject to interpretation between 
organizations (governmental and non-governmental), as well 
as nation states.  It can also be noted according to Emma 
Björnehed in her comprehensive examination of the topic,  
that even though the word is frequently used and 
serves as the foundation of several policy 
decisions, its definition is ambiguous in that it 
has different focus and implications depending on 
what part of the composite word is emphasised.16   
She further indicates that the United States Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) emphasizes the connection to 
terrorism in its definition by asserting that  
narco-terrorism may be characterized by the 
participation of groups or associated individuals 
in taxing, providing security for, or otherwise 
aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavours in 
an effort to further, or fund, terrorist 
activities.17   
                     
16 Emma Björnehed, "Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs 
and the War on Terror," Global Crime 6, no. 3 (August 2004), 306, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440570500273440 (accessed May 28, 2010). 
17 Björnehed, "Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and 
the War on Terror," 306. 
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In contrast to this definition, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
describes the word “narcoterrorism” to mean  
Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug 
traffickers.  It may include assassinations, 
extortion, hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings 
directed against judges, prosecutors, elected 
officials, or law enforcement agents, and general 
disruption of a legitimate government to divert 
attention from drug operations.18   
This divergence in the defining characteristics of the 
terminology can leave one open to interpret that its 
meaning can be twofold in nature.  Emma Bjornehed contends, 
in an informative discussion about the dual nature of 
narcoterrorism, that it is a challenging concept that serves 
to sometimes make matters worse rather than to open the 
doors to dialogue regarding the two perspectives it 
epitomizes.19 
This area of debate is further amplified in the March 
18, 2010, Congressional Research Service Report entitled, 
“International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security 
Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress.”  
This report provides a macro-level view of transnational 
crime (to include the narcotics trade) and its relationship 
to terrorism.  It discusses issues associated with the 
duality of the threat and the obstacles to establishing a 
coherent and effective U.S. policy.  The report argues,  
                     
18 Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associate Terms (Washington DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2010), 317, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict. 
19 Björnehed, Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the 
War on Terror, 307. 
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While the U.S. government has maintained 
substantial long-standing efforts to combat 
terrorism and transnational crime separately, 
questions remain about how and whether issues 
related to the interaction of the two threats are 
handled most effectively across the multiple U.S. 
agencies involved.20   
It goes on to further elaborate that efforts to deal 
with transnational crime can interconnect “in positive and 
negative ways with counterterrorism policy, raising 
fundamental questions about how to prioritize combating 
crime or terrorism aspects of a case when both elements are 
present.”21 
The ambiguous and complex character of the threat is 
typified in the 2010 United States National Security 
Strategy, since the term “narcoterrorism” is not explicitly 
referenced.  The correlation to illicit drug trafficking 
and terrorism is indirectly alluded to under the sub-
section, “Deterring Threats to the International Financial 
System”: 
Today’s open and global financial system also 
exposes us to global financial threats.  Just as 
we work to make the most of the opportunities 
that globalization brings, the actors that pose a 
threat to our national security—terrorists, 
proliferators, narcotics traffickers, corrupt 
officials, and others—are abusing the global 
financial system to raise, move, and safeguard 
funds that support their illicit activities or 
from which they derive profit.  Their support 
                     
20 John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, International Terrorism and 
Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations 
for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service [2010]), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=120420&coll=documents (accessed May 30, 
2010). 
21 Rollins and Wyler, International Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime, 45. 
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networks have global reach and are not contained 
by national borders.  Our strategy to attack 
these networks must respond in kind and target 
their illicit resources and access to the global 
financial system through financial measures, 
administration and enforcement of regulatory 
authorities, outreach to the private sector and 
our foreign partners, and collaboration on 
international standards and information sharing.22 
The dual nature of the narcoterrorist threat is but 
one aspect of the dilemma facing policy makers today.  How 
to prosecute the war against this relentless foe is the 
source of much contention and another area of debate among 
scholars and policy makers alike.  For example, the United 
States response of crop eradication has been sharply 
criticized as being too shortsighted and, at the end of the 
day, counterproductive.  Vanda Felbab-Brown, from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for 
International Studies, explores the scope of conventional 
wisdom that stimulates U.S. foreign policy regarding this 
topic and subjects it to the test of data and history.  In 
an excellent analysis of this issue, she argues,  
Because anti-government forces can derive large 
financial resources from the drug economy, 
Washington has given high priority to eradication 
in its relations with Afghanistan, Colombia, and 
Peru, among other countries.  The United States 
also insists that other Western countries and 
local governments adopt the same approach.  This 
view of the drug-conflict nexus, however, 
neglects crucial underlying dynamics of the 
interaction of illicit economies and military 
conflict.  Consequently, it frequently undermines 
                     
22 Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America (Washington DC: The White House, 2010), 33, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_secur
ity_strategy.pdf (accessed May 27, 2010). 
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government stabilization, the war on terrorism, 
and counter-drug efforts themselves.23   
Critics have thus contended that counternarcotics campaigns 
aimed at crop eradication, can have the inadvertent 
consequence of contributing to and further escalating the 
country’s ongoing civil unrest.24 
Moises Naim, in his book Illicit, provides a 
convincing assessment of the impact of globalization on 
worldwide illegal trafficking and emphasizes the 
interconnections between burgeoning illegal enterprises and 
how they continually recombine to create new sources of 
criminal revenue, mar the economy of entire countries and 
industries, enable terrorists, and even take over 
governments.  He makes the case that there is no evidence 
to suggest that governments are winning the fight against 
“illicit trades.”25  As he contends,  
The death of Pablo Escobar in Colombia did 
nothing to stem the production and export of 
drugs.  In Mexico, the spectacular arrests of 
leaders of the Arellano Felix organization and of 
the Gulf Cartel in 2002-2003 have not led to a 
reduction in trafficking, but simply a 
readjustment….26   
                     
23 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Essay on the Audit of the Conventional Wisdom: 
A Better Strategy Against Narcoterrorism (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Center for International Studies [2006]), 
https://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/mitcis/mitcis014/mitcis014.pdf (accessed 
May 28, 2010). 
24 Wyler, International Drug Control Policy, 29. 
25 Moises Naim, Illicit (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 221. 
26 Ibid. 
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Rhea Siers, in the book Transnational Threats:  
Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, 
expounds upon this point with a little more optimism by 
contending,  
No U.S. strategy will succeed without recognizing 
that we must all battle smuggling and trafficking 
abroad by reviving financial institutions, 
restoring governmental, judicial, and law 
enforcement integrity, and short-circuiting 
corruption.27 
In contrast to this global prescription, Felbab-Brown 
suggests that the only viable strategy to combat 
narcoterrorism is through an aggressive anti-drug campaign 
to diminish the demand.  As she declares,  
Ultimately, however, all drug-suppression efforts 
will continue being a shell-game, and terrorists, 
once having penetrated a certain aspect of the 
drug economy, will continue deriving the 
multifaceted benefits from it, unless major 
efforts are undertaken in consumer countries to 
reduce demand for drugs.28   
This viewpoint is countered by a 2004 Congressional 
Research Service report in a concise assessment of 
narcotics trafficking and the link to terrorism.  According 
to the report,  
American drug policy is not, and should not be, 
driven entirely, or even primarily, by the need 
to reduce the contribution of drug abuse to our 
vulnerability to terrorist action.  There are too 
many other goals to be served by the drug abuse 
control effort.  However, the links between the 
two issues are sufficiently clear that the 
                     
27 Kleiman, Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and 
Implications for Domestic Drug Control Policy, 20. 
28 U.S. Congress, Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and 
Terrorism - A Dangerous Mix, 1. 
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institutions of drug abuse control would be wise 
to factor the impact of their activities on the 
terrorist threat into their decision-making.29 
Another suggested approach to targeting the 
discernible connection between drug trafficking and 
terrorism is through the strengthening of U.S. domestic 
interagency relationships.  An extensive report assessing 
U.S. drug control policies by the Government Accountability 
Office was published in March 2009 under the auspices of 
the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.  
The report emphasized the increased importance of 
strengthening and building partnerships between agencies 
charted to both secure the homeland and combat the issue of 
the illicit drug trade:  
Given the global context of the war on drugs—
coupled with growing recognition since September 
11, 2001 (9/11), of the nexus between drug 
trafficking and terrorism - the mission of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and efforts 
to forge effective interagency partnerships and 
coordination are increasingly important.30   
It also recommended that,  
the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security take actions to enhance the 
effectiveness of (1) interagency partnerships 
involving the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection and (2) the  
                     
29 Amanda M. Leu, "Fighting Narcoterrorism," Joint Force Quarterly, 
October - December 2008, 56, http://intelros.ru/pdf/jfq_48/16.pdf 
(accessed April 30, 2010). 
30 Government Accountability Office, “Drug Control: Better 
Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and an Updated 
Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance DEA’s Efforts to Meet 
Post-9/11 Responsibilities” (Washington, DC: Government Accountability 
Office, 2009), 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0963.pdf (accessed June 
2, 2010). 
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multiagency Special Operations Division and the 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 
Fusion Center.31 
2. Areas of Scholarly Consensus 
There is widespread agreement and acknowledgement that 
terrorism, drugs and transnational organized crime 
represent significant threats to America’s national 
security.  In his opening statement at the May 2003 Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing on narcoterrorism, Senator 
Orrin Hatch declared,  
The problems of terrorism, drugs and 
international organized crime pose new and 
significant challenges to our country…these 
problems occur across our borders and are less 
and less subject to control by nation states.  
Terrorists around the world and in every region 
appear to be increasing their involvement in the 
trafficking of illegal drugs, primarily as a 
source of financing for their terrorist 
operations.32   
Amanda Leu, in the first quarter 2008 issue of Joint 
Force Quarterly, succinctly reiterates Senator Hatch’s 
assertion that terrorists groups are more and more turning 
to drug trafficking as a way to finance their operations.33  
The Director for Anticrime Programs, Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the 
U.S. Department of State, also emphasized the significance 
of this connection by stating,  
                     
31 Government Accountability Office, “Drug Control,” 1. 
32 Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. Congress, Narco-Terrorism: 
International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism - A Dangerous Mix, 103. 
33 UNODC 2010 Annual Report: Cutting the Threads of Drugs, Crime and 
Terrorism (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
[2010]), 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/UNODC_Annual_Report_2010_LowRe
s.pdf (accessed May 31, 2010). 
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While the debate moves forward on the extent of 
the crime-terror nexus, what is a given is that 
terrorists are indeed engaging in more criminal 
activities to guarantee success of their actions 
and evolving into criminal enterprises.  It is 
also true that a few criminal organizations are 
beginning to adopt more radical, if not more 
terrorist tactics.34 
The nexus between illegal drugs and terrorism is 
widely regarded to be a product of globalization.  The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Annual 
Report for 2010 highlights the fact that advances in 
globalization have contributed to the convergence of drug 
trafficking with terrorist activities by  
Taking advantage of innovations in technology, 
communication and transportation, loose networks 
of criminals or insurgents can easily link with 
each other, and also with organized criminal 
groups that operate internationally.  They 
smuggle illicit drugs, weapons, natural 
resources, counterfeit goods and human beings 
across borders and between continents for the 
enrichment of criminals, insurgents and crooked 
officials.  In some cases, they generate economic 
profits that support terrorist groups as well.35   
The Congressional Research Service Report on International 





                     
34 Rollins and Wyler, International Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress, 
1. 
35 Ester A. Bacon, "Balkan Trafficking in Historical Perspective," in 
Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and 
Human Life, ed. Kimberly L. Trachuk (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2007), 82. 
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also supports the claim that globalization has “hastened 
the expansion of relationships between terrorist and 
transnational crime groups.”36 
Another area of consensus concerns Turkey’s 
involvement with terrorism and the illicit narcotic trade.  
According to Ester Bacon in a historical account of drug 
trafficking in the Balkans Turkey is  
...a transit and originating country for drugs, 
humans and cigarettes that travel through the 
Balkan route.  It is also a major operating base 
for international narcotic traffickers 
responsible for all aspects of trafficking and 
refining drugs…Turkey is [also] one of the most 
advanced countries in the region in terms of 
countering illicit drug trafficking.”37   
A comprehensive examination of the Kurdish Workers 
Party by Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever focuses on how this 
terrorist organization, Turkey’s most prominent and 
devastating, finances its activities through organized 
crime.  The authors argue:  
The magnitude of transnational organized crimes 
is difficult to measure; nonetheless, the 
estimations and evaluations made by Turkish 
governmental organizations, especially the 
Turkish Police, have been used to offer the most 
dependable perspective for examining the 
convergence of organized crime and terrorism in 
Turkey.38 
                     
36 Roth and Sever, "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as a Criminal 
Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study," 
902. 
37 Rollins and Wyler, International Terrorism and Transnational 




Colombia is another country often cited by experts in 
the field of terrorism and international crime as a good 
case study that is germane to the analysis of narcotics 
trafficking and the relationship to terror networks.39  
Patricia Bibes’ case study of Colombia with respect to 
organized crime and terrorism provides an insightful 
account of the complex relationships that exist between 
drug traffickers, insurgent groups, its citizenry, and the 
government’s military and police forces.  The Colombian 
narcoterrorist threat provides a plethora of paradigms 
since many of its terrorist organizations, to include the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have over 
time morphed their ideology to be compatible with certain 
types of criminal endeavors such as drug trafficking.40 
3. Gaps in Scholarly Research 
After preliminary examination, it would seem that a 
finite quantity of convincing and comprehensive 
intelligence is gathered with respect to the connection 
between drugs and terrorism.  According to the 
Congressional Research Service report on the ostensible 
nexus between global terrorism and transnational crime, 
analysts perceive that there continues to be an 
intelligence and research gap in the frequency, threat, and 
prospective trends related to criminal-terrorist links.41 
                     
39 Bibes, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Colombia, a 
Case Study, 243. 
40 Rollins and Wyler, International Terrorism and Transnational 




This claim is further amplified by the report’s 
additional observations: 
Some suggest that credible human and signals 
intelligence sources are essential to countering 
the threat from the confluence of terrorist and 
criminal organizations.  Such observers also 
argue that more research on the subject from 
academic and non-profit communities could also 
improve the availability of knowledge on the 
subject.  Without such resources, the 
intelligence community and the wider policy 
community cannot accurately gauge the scope and 
nature of relationships between terrorists and 
criminal actors, as well as to assess convergence 
trends and predict future connections.  In turn, 
lack of assessment on how, why, and in what ways 
criminals and terrorists liaise with each other 
can prevent policymakers from devising 
appropriate strategies to combat the nexus.42 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This study uses an analytical approach to examine the 
historical context of narcoterrorism, as well as current 
policy practices and trends that define America’s strategy 
toward countering this phenomenon.  In-depth case studies 
are also used to determine whether any lessons, both 
positive and negative, can be gleaned from the Turkish and 
Colombian efforts to stem the tide of violence and 
corruption associated with the narcoterrorist nexus. 
To conduct this research, this thesis relies upon 
several sources of data to assess the current U.S. policy 
climate with respect to illegal drug trafficking and 
terrorism.  Reports from the Congressional Research 
Service, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency, as well as Congressional testimony are 
                     
42 Rollins and Wyler, International Terrorism, 4. 
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also used to ascertain the perceived challenges associated 
with the complex issue of narcoterrorism.  In addition to 
the sources already identified in the literature review, 
the insight and observations presented by various non-
governmental research organizations and government think 
tanks, to include the Heritage Foundation and the RAND 
Corporation, are also leveraged to investigate differing 
viewpoints with respect to the underlying effectiveness of 
previous and existing U.S. strategies to combat this 
threat.  Scholarly works by leading experts in the field of 
narcoterrorism are also consulted.  Kimberley Thachuk’s 
book, Transnational Threats:  Smuggling in Arms, Drugs, and 
Human Life, provides and extensive collection of essays 
which explore the connection between international 
criminals and terrorists engaged in smuggling and 
trafficking everything from weapons of mass destruction to 
illicit narcotics, and have the potential to upset regional 
stability, undermine United States interests abroad, and 
threaten U.S. national security.  Data compiled and 
presented in the Library of Congress Federal Research 
Division report on “The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics 
Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime 
Networks in Western Europe” is also consulted to further 
compare and contrast other nation’s attempts to counter the 
threat posed by narcoterrorism. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis provides an analysis of the topic of 
narcoterrorism through the use of in-depth comparative case 
studies, examining the countries of Colombia and Turkey to 
determine if there are any causal relationships and lessons 
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that can be applied to current U.S. policy initiatives to 
address the issue of drug trafficking and its ties to 
terrorism.  The first section of the thesis focuses on the 
historical context of narcoterrorism and its connection to 
the “War on Drugs” and the “War on Terror.”  It also 
considers the issue of supply and demand with respect to 
the trafficking of illegal drugs and the impact of 
globalization on the narcoterrorist phenomenon.  This 
section concludes with a survey of existing U.S. policies 
and practices to combat the threat and current  
measures adopted to address the convergence of 
transnational terrorism and organized crime. 
This thesis also examines the case studies of Turkey 
and Colombia by dissecting the nature of the threat, 
exploring the actions taken by each country to counter the 
threat, and evaluating the intended and unintended 
consequences of these actions.  The impact of the 
narcoterrorist organization, the Kurdish Workers Party, on 
Turkish counterterrorism strategy is also researched to 
assess any lessons, both positive and negative, that may be 
applicable to the current U.S. policy toward illicit drug 
trafficking and the connection to terrorism.  The 
relationship of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) to organized crime, the drug trade, and terrorism 
and its impact on the Colombian government’s approach to 
counterterrorism is also studied to evaluate if additional 
lessons may provide the basis for the application of ideas 
and extension of methods to current U.S. policy challenges 
associated with a coherent narcoterrorist strategy. 
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The final section of this thesis presents the 
conclusions and recommendations based on the research 
conducted.  As previously indicated, the initial hypothesis 
of this thesis is that narcoterrorism poses a significant 
and pervasive threat to U.S. national security and that 
countermeasures to date have yet to secure the U.S. 
homeland or interests abroad.  Until America comes to terms 
with the global nature of the threat, improves interagency 
cooperative efforts, and is willing to commit a steady 
stream of resources to the problem, terrorism and organized 
crime will continue to flourish for the foreseeable future.  
Establishing effective security in the Hemisphere and 
keeping allies committed to the fight against terrorism and 
drug trafficking will require the U.S. to exercise 
continued vigilance and place increased emphasis on 
deterring this threat to homeland security and defense. 
 24
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II. OVERVIEW OF NARCOTERRORISM 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND NARCOTERRORISM DEFINED 
The United States recognizes that the problems of 
drug and drug-related violence require a 
comprehensive solution.  Democratic institutions 
in drug-producing regions must become stronger, 
more responsive, more inclusive, and more 
transparent. 43 
—Assistant Secretary David T. Johnson, 
United States Department of State, Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs 
1. Introduction 
Terrorism and the drug problem pose an enormous threat 
to the stability of the modern world.  While both have 
moved to the forefront of the world’s agenda during the 
early part of the twentieth century, they have each existed 
in varying forms and degrees throughout history.  The drug 
phenomenon especially has played an important part in world 
politics due to modern advances in international 
transportation and communication capabilities.  A review of 
the historical development of the drug issue in world 
politics and a consideration of the drug trade’s enormous 
economic potential would shed light on the ways in which it 
could potentially foster organized crime groups and 
terrorist organizations.  In addition, a survey of the 
challenges faced when defining the multi-dimensional 
phenomenon of narcoterrorism will facilitate a more 
                     
43 David T. Johnson, "Release of the 2009 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report," U.S. Department of State Website, 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/119890.htm (accessed October 6, 
2010).  
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coherent understanding of the issues at hand and aid in the 
formulation of recommendations for the future. 
2. The Drug Problem 
Human beings have always consumed drugs for social, 
medicinal, holy and dietary purposes.  They have used wine, 
tobacco, opium, marijuana, coffee, coca, hallucinogens and 
many other drugs that predate history to keep themselves 
awake, lessen pain and increase virility.44  China and 
several European countries obtained the drug opium from 
Western Asia until the late pre-modern period.  Merchants 
who traded internationally predominantly carried rare 
metals, minerals, luxury items, slaves, and exotic crops or 
products.  Among these exotics were rare tree bask and 
resins, fragrant incense and musk, spices, herbs, and 
certainly opiate.  These exotics were shipped thousands of 
miles to lands where they did not grow, their rarity 
ensuring an extremely high profit margin. 
Before the early twentieth century, Western nations 
did not give much thought to drug-related problems.  This 
laissez-faire approach toward drug use enabled drug 
consumption levels to increase and allowed a rise in the 
popularity of home remedies over medical science.  However, 
once the negative effects of the abuse of drugs such as 
cocaine became apparent, Westerners began to approach the 
drug problem with concern.  The decision to be made was not 
whether to regulate drugs, rather how much regulation 
should there be. 
                     
44  William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: 
An International History (London: Routledge, 2000), xv-xvi. 
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The negative side effects of cocaine and opiate 
addiction became a hot political topic.  Social reform 
groups took up the cause of drug control both for the sake 
of eradicating drugs and to further their own agendas, 
using the drug issue to gain the public ear.  Often led by 
fundamentalist Protestant women, these reform groups touted 
public heath care, child welfare, social work and self-
control.  In the early twentieth century, several 
organizations, both public and private, began to show an 
open desire to organize a multi-national effort to combat 
the drug trade.45 
The first international conference on drugs, The 
Shanghai Opium Commission (1909) was organized by the 
United States (U.S.).  There are three main reasons the 
Americans arranged the Shanghai Opium Commission.  First, 
Americans had never been involved in the opium trade with 
China, mainly due to moral and religious objections.  
Western missionaries shaped American perception of China.  
Americans, like many Westerners at the time, understood 
little about the Chinese customs, and thus dismissed their 
culture as immoral and inferior.  Secondly, Americans hoped 
that the Chinese government and people would abandon their 
long-term enemy, Europeans, and favor the U.S. with 
profitable trade arrangements like those between China and 
several Western nations.  Lastly, Americans were worried 
about opium because of addiction problems in their Pacific 
Island colonies, namely the Philippines.  Spain, who 
formerly controlled the Islands, was selling opium to the  
 
                     
45 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 14. 
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U.S. islands for revenue, as were many other European 
nations, even though Americans were characterized by 
uprightness by the time.46 
Americans were not satisfied with the result of 
Shanghai Opium Commission due to the failure of the nations 
to solidify an agreement.  This inadequacy gave a birth to 
The Hague Opium Conference and Convention (1911-1912).  
Only eight months after the Shanghai Commission met, the 
U.S. sent invitations for the Hague Conference to the same 
countries who had been in Shanghai.  Americans justified 
this invitation by stressing their own drug problem and the 
need for international cooperation to overcome the problem, 
as no country could overcome it by itself.47 
After these initial attempts to organize international 
cooperation to solve the drug dilemma, no significant steps 
were taken toward an effective multinational effort until 
after World War II.  In the 1960s, the U.S., now a major 
world power, and a big portion of the international 
community realized that there was still no serious and 
comprehensive multinational plan to overcome the drug 
problem.  The United Nations then generated its most 
famous, and perhaps the most regulatory treaties.  The 
1961, 1971 and 1988 United Nations conventions were 
revolutionary developments in the worldwide co-operation 
against the drug problem.  The 1961 Single Convention 
intended to eliminate the illegitimate production of drugs.  
                     
46 Kathryn Meyer and Terry Parssinen, Webs of Smoke: Smugglers, 
Warlords, Spies, and the History of the International Drug Trade 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 21-22. 
47 Arnold H. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 
1900-1939: A Study in International Humanitarian Reform (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1969), 45. 
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It also sought to regulate the legal production, 
manufacture, trade, distribution, and consumption of the 
drugs that are mainly derived from natural plants such as 
cocaine, heroin and marijuana.  The Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and 1972 amendment 
protocol of Single Convention, addressed the synthetic 
substances, creating provisions to regulate their trade, 
selling, distribution and stocking.  Finally, after the 
efforts of the first two conventions proved uninspiring, 
the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances revisited the issue of 
international regulations.  This last convention intended 
to improve international cooperation and encourage 
governments to take serious measures against the drug 
problem.  It has since been instrumental in furthering the 
implementation of programs that effectively combat drug 
trafficking and abuse, programs that advocate judicial 
cooperation, the extradition of traffickers, controlled 
delivery and the action against the laundering of money 
derived from illicit drug trafficking.48 
Despite national and international efforts, drug use 
and trafficking continue to invade everyday life.  
According to the United Nations, some 180 million people 
globally were consuming drugs in the late 1990s.  This 
number includes 144 million consuming cannabis, 29 million 
people consuming amphetamines, 14 million people taking 
cocaine and 13 million people abusing opiates, 9 million of 
                     
48 United Nations, Report of the International Narcotics Control 
Board for 1999 (Vienna: INCB [1999]), 
http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/ar/1999/incb_report_1999_2.pdf (accessed 
August 10, 2010). 
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whom were addicted to heroin49.  These figures have 
increased substantially over the past ten years.  The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates 
in its Annual World Drug Report for 2010 that,  
Globally. . .between 155 and 250 million people 
(3.5 to 5.7% of the population aged 15-64) used 
illicit substances at least once in 2008.  
Globally, cannabis users comprise the largest 
number of illicit drug users (129-190 million 
people).  Amphetamine-group substances rank as 
the second most commonly used drug, followed by 
cocaine and opiates.50   
The United States is the largest single consumer of 
illicit drugs in the world.  In 2009, the National Survey 
on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) estimated that approximately 
21.8 million Americans aged 12 or older were 
current (past month) illicit drug users, meaning 
they had used an illicit drug during the month 
prior to the survey interview.  This estimate 
represents 8.7 percent of the population aged 12 
or older.51   
                     
49 United Nations, ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime Statistics: 
Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001 (New York: United Nations Office for 
Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) [2001]), 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/report_2001-06-26_1/report_2001-06-26_1.pdf 
(accessed August 16, 2010). 
50 United Nations, World Drug Report 2010 (Vienna: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) [2010]), 
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res.pdf (accessed August 15, 2010). 
51 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug use and Health: Volume I. 
Summary of National Findings (Rockville, MD: Office of Applied Studies 
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Figure 1.   Past Month Illicit Drug Use among Persons 
Aged 12 or Older: 200952 
Many millions more people around the world take part 
in the supply side of the drug trade by producing, 
trafficking, and distributing illicit drugs.  The trade in 
illegal narcotics is a multi-billion dollar global business 
at some $322 billion, according to the United Nations World 
Drug Report, 2007.53  It attracts criminal organizations 
because the potential profits are significantly more than 
from other criminal commodities. 
                     
52 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug use and Health: Volume I. 
53 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug 
Report 2007 (Vienna: United Nations [2007]), 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007_2.1_introduction.pdf 
(accessed August 20, 2010). 
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Figure 2.   Estimated Global Value of Illicit Markets54 
As the 2007 report notes, the high value is 
understandable because “unlike human beings, diamonds or 
firearms, the drug supply is consumed each year and in need 
of continuous renewal.”55  It is also a global issue because 
profits [from illicit drugs] accrue to a wide 
range of actors, from poor rural farmers to 
affluent urban dealers.  But, in many instances, 
the single most profitable sector of the market 
is the process of transporting the drugs 
internationally.  The funds raised by trafficking 
groups can be used to underwrite other criminal 
activity and even political insurgency.56 
                     





This international illicit economy has developed its 
own underground organizations.  The U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) indicates that international organized 
crime organizations from a variety of countries control 
every stage of the illicit drug trade from production to 
final street-level sale.  International terrorist groups 
also use the structure of these trafficking networks as 
their organizational model.  They control their employees 
very rigidly, utilizing a highly compartmentalized cell 
structure that keeps the divide between the production, 
shipment, distribution, money laundering, communications, 
security, and recruitment phases, all separate and distinct 
from one another.  Each cell operates independently with no 
knowledge of the other cells.  Drug trafficking 
organizations are capable of purchasing the most advanced 
transportation and communication technologies including 
sophisticated aircraft, land and water vessels, sonar, and 
radar.  They may also have an arsenal of weapons and 
soldiers to use them.  They have established vast 
counterintelligence capabilities and transportation 
networks.   
Current international crime networks are harder to 
combat than organized crime syndicates of the past.  
Today’s crime networks have a greater inclination toward 
violence and have a more sophisticated operating strategy 
than past networks.  Today’s groups often corrupt entire 
governments in order to utilize all of the state’s 
institutions and governmental apparatus.  Previously, 
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organized crime groups simply endeavored to corrupt 
individuals such as police officers and judges.57 
3. Terrorism 
Terrorism, on the other hand, is a more controversial 
issue than the drug problem.  Its political nature makes it 
difficult to adequately define.  On occasion, an author may 
attempt to define terrorism.  However, such an attempt is 
often followed by a disclaimer about the possible existence 
of other definitions.  There are hundreds of definitions of 
terrorism.  There is simply no standard.  However, the 
following definitions are useful due to their academic and 
institutional nature.  Grant Wardlaw offers this definition 
with the belief that a globally accepted definition of 
terrorism must contain the concept of individual 
inspiration, social setting, and political rationale as 
well as general behavioral description: 
Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, 
of violence, by an individual or a group, whether 
acting for or in opposition to established 
authority, when such action is designed to create 
extreme anxiety and/or inducing effects in a 
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with the purpose of coercing that group into 
acceding to the political demands of the 
perpetrators.58 
This is a very comprehensive definition, but it restricts 
terrorism to political terrorism.   
Other definitions state that terrorism is not a tactic 
for only insurgencies or revolutionaries but also is a 
tactic employed by some states.  Consider the following 
definitions employed by the United States Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in the Terrorism 2002-2005 report.  The 
Code of Federal Regulations (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85) 
defines terrorism as, “The unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
objectives.”  The FBI goes on to further express terrorism 
in terms of its domestic or international character.  Which 
terminology is used is dependent “on the origin, base, and 
objectives of the terrorist organization.”59  The 
institutional perspective of the FBI does not differentiate 
dramatically from academic perspectives.  However, the FBI 
focuses on the legal and investigative dimensions of the 
problem while academia concentrates on the political and 
social consequences of the phenomenon. 
Terrorism can be traced as far back as the drug 
problem.  Assassinations were common terrorist acts even in 
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its infancy.  The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. 
can be considered a terrorist act.60  Caesar, the Roman 
emperor, was murdered for political gain.  This is 
terrorism, by its very definition; today’s political 
scientists interpret the act of assassination as a 
terrorist enterprise by defining it as the murder of the 
leader or another administrator of the state, individually 
or as a group.61 
The writings of Josephus Flavius provide insight into 
an early-organized terrorist group called the Sicari, which 
was an extreme Jewish sect that arose in prominence after 
the Roman invasion of Palestine.  The Sicari used the 
crowds of religious festivals to camouflage their attacks 
as they assaulted their rivals with sicas, or “short 
blades” which were concealed under their coats.  They were 
active mainly in urban areas, a direct contrast to other 
zealots who employed guerrilla warfare tactics against the 
Romans in rural areas.  Reportedly, the Sicari destroyed 
the fortress and archives of the Herodian dynasty and 
killed the renowned priest.62 
The Order of the Assassins was another influential 
radical terrorist group.  Hassan Sabah, the founder of the 
order, manifested an extreme form of the Shi’a Ismaili 
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doctrine, an Islamic sect.  Initially, the Assassins were 
established in mountain fortresses.  They began by invading 
the fortress Alamut in 1090 and went on to attack man other 
strongholds eventually expanding their terror to urban 
areas.  They killed many influential enemies, including the 
Sultan of Baghdad Nazim al Mulq, Count Raymond II of 
Tripoli in Syria, and the ruler of the Jerusalem Kingdom, 
Marquis Conrad of Montferrat.  They terrorized Persia, 
Syria and Palestine for many years.  The Order of the 
Assassins was the first terrorist group on record to 
utilize disguises and suicide attacks to cripple their 
opponents.63 
A resurgence of guerilla warfare tactics was employed 
in Russia during the nineteenth century.  Anarchists and 
other opponents of the Russian government employed 
terrorist lines of attack both as a propaganda tool and to 
reshape the Russian government.  The murder of Tsar 
Alexander II in March 1881 was one of the most influential 
terrorist assaults of the nineteenth century.  The 
assassination was perpetrated by the terrorist group, 
Narodya Volya, nicknamed “the People’s Will.”  It created a 
centralized, well disguised, and most significant 
organization in a time of diverse liberation movements in 
Russia.  “In addition to precipitating the beginning of the 
end of czarist rule the group also deeply influenced 
individual revolutionaries and subversive organizations 
elsewhere.”64 
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The twentieth century also witnessed the birth of new 
terrorist organizations and renewed acts of violence.  
Armenian terrorists carried out a three-step terrorist 
campaign against the Turks, which continued until the 
1980s.  The Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
(IMRO) can be considered one of the first examples of 
state-sponsored terrorism, since it was supported by the 
Bulgarian Government.  Terrorism manifested itself as 
guerilla movements in agrarian cultures; however, it also 
emerged in the inner cities of urban societies.  Groups 
such as the Irgun and Stern Gang of Israel, Tuparamos of 
Uruguay, Red Army of Germany, the Red Brigades of Italy, 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) of Ireland, and the Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna (ETA) of Spain are all examples of twentieth 
century terrorist organizations that flourished during the 
latter part of the century.65 
The growing use and impact of nationally sponsored 
terrorism sparked endless debate and discourse amongst 
European Leftist groups regarding the validity and morality 
of terrorism.  Many of the principal proponents of the 
leftist movement refused to employ terrorism preferring 
open armed conflict to subversive methods.  However, two 
German philosophers, Karl Heintzen and Johann Most, 
disagreed with this philosophy.  They believed 
assassinations to be a political must.  They both moved to 
the United States from Germany and continued to be 
theorists of terrorism.  Heintzen saw improved technology 
and weapons of mass destruction to be the key for achieving 
revolution.  Johann Most in his New York newspaper, 
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Freiheit, became an influential anarchist spokesperson.  He 
believed in the effectiveness and necessity of violence, 
advocating for the development of weapons of mass 
destruction.  Writings published in the Freiheit were the 
inspiration for The Anarchist Cookbook, published by the 
American New Left in the 1960s.  To this day, the Cookbook 
is the standard text for terrorists worldwide.66 
4. Drug-Terrorism Nexus 
Neither the drug phenomenon nor terrorism are new 
issues.  Nevertheless, the drug-terrorism connection is a 
fairly new area of concern for the global community.  Drug 
related terrorism, or “narcoterrorism” is usually 
considered to take one of two forms.  Firstly, terrorist 
organizations may be directly involved in drug-related 
activities by producing, trafficking, and distributing 
illegal drugs as in the case of Afghanistan’s Taliban 
regime.  An October 2001 Congressional Research Service 
Report entitled Taliban and the Drug Trade, makes reference 
to British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s growing concern that 
the Taliban financed a substantial share of its military 
operations from the drug trade and used income from the 
opium trade to fund extremists in neighboring countries.67  
In Addiction, Crime and Insurgency, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) documents that a decade 
ago the Taliban earned $75-100 million per year by taxing 
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opium poppy cultivation.  Since 2005, the Taliban and other 
insurgents in Afghanistan have derived $90-160 million per 
year just from taxing opium production and trade.68 
 
Figure 3.   Global Opiate Market Value (US$ 65 
billion/year)69 
Secondly, narcoterrorism may occur when drug 
trafficking organizations use terrorist tactics, such as 
the assassinations, bombings and kidnappings directed 
against anti-narcotics police forces in Colombia and Peru 
during the 1980s and 1990s.70  In either case, the goal of 
the narcoterrorist group is to generate revenue.  The only 
difference between a terrorist-based group and a drug 
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trafficking-based group is the final objective.  While 
terrorist groups seek monetary recompense to finance their 
violent political activities, drug trafficking networks 
reach their ultimate aspiration of achieving power and 
fortune when the exchange of illegal drugs for money 
transpires.  Nonetheless, types of narcoterrorism are not 
restricted by these two types of distinctions. 
Another important aspect of narcoterrorism is its 
political nature.  While certain organizations are 
considered “terrorist” by some countries, others name them 
freedom fighters, guerillas or insurgents.71   These are 
purely semantic arguments and complicate efforts to combat 
illicit drug trafficking and international terrorism.  For 
example, in Turkey, which has been a hive of terrorist and 
illicit drug trafficking activity for several decades, many 
drug seizures were made during the 1980s and 1990s which 
pointed to a connection between the terrorist organization 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and an international drug 
trafficking ring.  It was proven that all of these drug 
traffickers were PKK militants.72  Nevertheless, many 
governments in Europe did not consider the PKK to be a 
terrorist organization and a threat to regional stability 
in spite of clearly verifiable PKK violence and evidentiary 
documentation linking the group to organized crime and drug 
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trafficking networks.73 Following persistent demands from 
Turkey that the PKK be added to the Council of the European 
Union’s (EU) list of terrorist organizations, the inclusion 
of the group was finally heralded on May 2, 2002.74 
Because it occurs in a variety of forms, it is 
difficult to provide a universal definition of 
narcoterrorism.  However, a working definition of 
narcoterrorism would be helpful to establish a basis for 
discussion.  The United States Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) defines narcoterrorism as the “participation of 
groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing 
security for, otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking 
endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist 
activities.”75  Given this definition, narcoterrorism exists 
in several forms.  It may manifest itself as the direct or 
indirect involvement of terrorist or insurgent 
organizations in the illicit drug trade.  It also may 
consist of the employment of terrorist-like tactics by drug 
trafficking organizations.  Governments can become 
narcoterrorist entities by supporting terrorist 
organizations that smuggle illegal drugs, or by controlling 
the drug trade through the taxation of illicit crop yields.   
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Governments may even covertly use their own resources to 
traffic drugs with the goal of obtaining financial power or 
destabilizing enemy societies. 
Drug trafficking and terrorism are profoundly affected 
by the politics of world powers.  According to some 
scholars, simply labeling a group as a “terrorist” 
organization can result in negative and isolating 
consequences for the group.  The term ‘drug trafficker’ has 
equally negative connotations.  To label a group as both a 
purveyor of terrorism and illicit drugs creates an 
extremely negative image for the group in the eyes of the 
public.  Some governments will use the label 
“narcoterrorist” to describe an organization in an attempt 
to put the group in public disfavor, effectively 
neutralizing its power and grip over the populace.  This 
action may be pure governmental denigration or the 
exaggeration of a few incidents.76   
Other subject matter experts, however, argue that 
groups with the propensity to employ terrorist tactics or 
to traffic illegal narcotics should not be categorized as 
the victim of political denouncement.  Exhibiting sympathy 
for a drug trafficker because he is incorrectly labeled as 
a “narcoterrorist” is simply absurd.  To date, intellectual 
sympathy toward revolutionary or insurgent groups has 
forced many scholars to focus on governmental repression 
techniques and international imperialistic policies.  On 
the one hand, this focus has exerted pressure on 
governments to not violate basic human rights.  Conversely, 
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it has also inadvertently resulted in support for terrorist 
and drug trafficking organizations.  Literature on this 
issue generally emphasizes the political aspects of 
narcoterrorism.  However, the labeling theory debate 
encourages the reader to examine both sides of the 
argument. 
Miller and Damask claim that the term “narcoterrorism” 
has meaning both implicitly and explicitly.  The term has 
generated connotations beyond its own unique and 
operational definitions.  Unfortunately, despite the legal 
appeal of its two elements, narcoterrorism as a turn of 
phrase does not convey a definitive understanding of what 
exactly it is.  According to some eminent scholars in the 
field,  
[when] properly analyzed ‘narco-terrorism emerges 
as a political myth based on a stereotypic view 
of the Andean drug trade, peasant insurgency and 
the relationships between them.  The myth of 
‘narco-terrorism coincided with the Latin 
American policy interests of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations.77   
Moreover, the evolution and politicization of this concept 
has hindered both scholarship and policy making with 
respect to the nexus between terrorism and narcotics 
trafficking.78  The subsequent years following its 
introduction to the global lexicon yielded a contemplation 
of the term “narcoterrorism” and ultimately resulted with 
the expression being applied with more frequency and 
fervor. 
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A distinct approach to the narcoterrorist phenomenon 
is provided by Peter Lupsha.  He delineates the precise 
theoretical distinctions inherent in the subject and tries 
to create a typology of narcoterrorism.  Lupsha, like many 
other scholars, recognizes the ambiguous and imprecise 
nature of the term narcoterrorism.  He declares,  
As a concept from which one can develop better 
models for understanding both drug trafficking 
and issues of insurgent conflict, “narco-
terrorism” is currently a badly defined and 
politically contaminated term.79 
B. U.S. STRATEGIES TO COMBAT NARCOTERRORISM:  THE 
SYNTHESIS OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERDRUG 
APPROACHES 
The dual nature of the narcoterrorist threat that is 
epitomized by its nebulous defining characteristics is but 
one aspect of the dilemma facing policy makers today.  How 
to prosecute the war against this relentless foe and the 
disposition of the link between terrorists and drug 
traffickers are the source of much contention and 
controversy and yet another area of debate among scholars 
and policy-makers alike.  It has been assessed by many 
analysts that the debate on measures to counter 
narcoterrorism is parallel to the debate on measures to 
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counter transnational illicit drug trafficking.80  What has 
clouded both of these debates is how to reconcile the 
priorities of counternarcotics policies with 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and finance reform 
policies.81  Complicating matters still further is the 
number of organizations involved in the policy-making 
process and its implementation. 
America’s struggle to come to grips with and tackle 
the affiliation between crime and terrorism “are a subset 
of broader policy responses to transnational crime and 
international terrorism individually,”82 according to the 
2010 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, which 
explores the linkages between international terrorism and 
transnational Crime and assesses potential policy 
implications.  The report goes on to further elaborate that 
even though many U.S. strategies and policy agendas are 
intended to handle international terrorism and 
transnational crime as discrete issues, fewer efforts 
concentrate exclusively on dealing with the merger of 
terrorism and crime and the tangential issue of the 
interaction between drug trafficking and terrorist 
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financing.83  Moreover, Professors Harold Trinkunas and 
Jeanne Giraldo assert in the book Terrorist Financing and 
State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, U.S. decision-
making efforts are flawed from the start by the mistaken 
belief that the nature of the relationship between 
terrorists and drug traffickers is  
a strategic alliance instead of the more common 
marriages of convenience or even antagonism that 
characterizes such ties...although some nexus 
between terrorism and the illegal drug trade is 
clear–according to a survey of 38 countries, 
about half of them noticed some link between the 
two–the exact nature of this relationship has 
often been misunderstood.84   
In contrast to this point of view and again reiterating the 
divergence of opinion when it comes to narcoterrorist 
policies, the 2004 Congressional Research Service report 
entitled “Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal 
Links and Implications for Domestic Drug Control Policy,” 
makes the distinction that no matter the exact nature of 
the motives which provide the impetus for  the fusion of 
terrorism and the booming illicit narcotics trade, the 
utter magnitude of this industry is a significant indicator 
of the part it may play in terrorist financing operations: 
Whichever aspect of the potential drug/terror 
connection we look at, the sheer scale of the 
illicit drug industry (measured in dollars) is an 
important determinant of the contribution it may 
make to terrorism.  The correct weighting of drug 
control objectives against anti-terrorist 
                     
83 Rollins and Wyler, International Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress, 
32. 
84 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., Terrorism 
Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 26. 
 48
objectives depends in part on how much drug 
trafficking actually contributes to the threat of 
terrorist action, and how much antidrug efforts 
could do to reduce that contribution.  Those 
factors, in turn, are likely to vary from drug to 
drug.85 
Policy papers and strategic guidance dating back to 
the Clinton Administration have recognized the potentially 
budding nexus between criminals and terrorists as a source 
of trepidation.86  According to the above-mentioned 2010 CRS 
report on international terrorism and transnational crime, 
current strategy documents that endeavor to address this 
evolving threat include the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence’s 2009 National Intelligence 
Strategy,  
which identifies violent extremist groups, 
insurgents, and transnational criminal 
organizations as the top three non-state and sub-
state threats to U.S. national interests.87   
The report also cites The Office on National Drug 
Control Policy’s 2009 National Drug Control Strategy 
stating that it  
justifies the policy goal of disrupting the 
market for illegal drugs in part because of the 
illicit profits and potential alliances 
cultivated by the drug trade that also facilitate 
the activities of international terrorists and 
transnational criminals.88   
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Moreover this policy assessment also references, the 
2008 Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International 
Organized Crime published by The Department of Justice 
asserting that it recognizes “criminal logistical and other 
support to terrorists as one of the top threats posed by 
international organized crime.”89  However, it is the 
conclusion of this report, along with several other 
analyses on the subject, that the policies outlined in 
these national strategies fail to equip the U.S. government 
with a “comprehensive or whole-of-government approach” to 
isolating and fighting the connection between global 
illicit enterprises and terrorism.90 
The U.S. oversees or manages a majority of the actions 
to counter narcoterrorist activities around the world, and 
the volume of knowledge utilized by such actions is derived 
mainly from American analyses and intelligence reports.91  
Within the bureaucratic entities of the U.S. government, 
the organizational responsibility for narcoterrorism policy 
is distributed amongst a consortium of domestic and foreign 
policy-oriented agencies.  The White House-based Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National 
Security Council (NSC) are officially designated as the 
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principal organizations for the synchronization of 
narcoterrorism policy, and they are responsible for 
coordinating actions amongst a myriad of departments and 
agencies to include the Departments of Health and Human 
Services (Centers for Disease Control and National 
Institutes of Health), Justice (Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United 
States Marshals, United States Attorneys, and the Bureau of 
Prisons), Treasury (United States Secret Service and the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms), Homeland 
Security (Bureau of Immigration, United States Border 
Patrol, and United States Customs), Education, Labor, 
Veterans Affairs, Defense, and State. 92  This lengthy list 
of organizations illustrates one of the many challenges 
associated with deriving a coherent policy with respect to 
narcoterrorism.  Unity of action becomes increasingly 
complex when policy decisions involve many different 
agencies and departments from within the U.S. government’s 
infrastructure. 
The issue of whether the problem of narcotics 
trafficking resides with the consuming or producing nation 
has predominantly driven U.S. policy regarding 
narcoterrorism.  The United States has been at the heart of 
the deliberations between producer and consumer countries 
for decades, with the debate focused on the issue of 
culpability, both sides perceiving the other responsible 
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for solving the problem.93  From the producer nation’s 
perspective, typically underdeveloped or developing 
countries, the economic nature of the issue is emphasized.  
It is deemed critical for the consumer nation to eliminate 
or at least decrease the demand for illegal narcotics, 
thereby stemming the flow of drug money into the country.  
The high demand for drugs is viewed as the root cause of 
the problem.  Hartelius contends,  
From the perspective of the producer countries, 
the emergence of narcoterrorism is just another 
domestic consequence of the problem, which is 
created by the ongoing demand.94   
Consumer countries, most notably the U.S., regard the 
source of the problem lies with the producer country.95  
Thus, U.S. policy has been to directly assail the drug 
problem at its source from within the consumer country in a 
vain attempt to thwart the drugs from reaching the illicit 
marketplace.  It involves creating policies that 
concentrate on crop eradication, interdiction, and arrest 
in the supply-side countries and it applies pressure to 
known locations of drug trafficking routes before the 
illicit commodities reach the United States.  This policy 
has been implemented using various lines of attack that, 
over the years, have met with limited successes. 
The approach of crop eradication, one of the tactics 
employed by the U.S. in prosecuting its policy of a direct 
assault on the narcoterrorist threat, has been sharply 
criticized as being far too shortsighted and at the end of 
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the day counterproductive.  This technique is highlighted 
due to the fact that it has become one of the most 
controversial aspects of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.  
Vanda Felbab-Brown from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Center for International Studies explores the 
scope of “conventional wisdom” that stimulates U.S. foreign 
policy debate regarding this topic.  She contends that,  
Because anti-government forces can derive large 
financial resources from the drug economy, Washington 
has given high priority to eradication in its 
relations with Afghanistan, Colombia, and Peru, among 
other countries.  The United States also insists that 
other Western countries and local governments adopt 
the same approach.  This view of the drug-conflict 
nexus, however, neglects crucial underlying dynamics 
of the interaction of illicit economies and military 
conflict.  Consequently, it frequently undermines 
government stabilization, the war on terrorism, and 
counter-drug efforts themselves.96   
Critics have thus argued that counternarcotics 
campaigns aimed at crop eradication, can have the 
inadvertent consequence of contributing to and further 
escalating the country’s ongoing civil unrest.  
Additionally, this policy approach toward countering the 
narcoterrorist threat has placed “significant attention on 
the increased utilization of American military power.”97  
This approach has, in turn, led to further criticism over 
concerns of the application of the military in what have 
normally been regarded as law enforcement and societal 
matters.98 
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Another policy tactic employed by the U.S. government 
to target the discernible connection between drug 
trafficking and terrorism has been through attempts at 
strengthening domestic as well as international interagency 
relationships.  An extensive report assessing U.S. drug 
control policies by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) was published in March 2009 under the auspices of the 
U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.  The 
report emphasized the increased importance of strengthening 
and building partnerships between agencies charted to both 
secure the homeland and combat the issue of the illicit 
drug trade by asserting,  
Given the global context of the war on drugs—
coupled with growing recognition since September 
11, 2001 (9/11), of the nexus between drug 
trafficking and terrorism - the mission of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and efforts 
to forge effective interagency partnerships and 
coordination are increasingly important.99   
It also recommended that,  
the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security take actions to enhance the 
effectiveness of (1) interagency partnerships 
involving the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection and (2) the 
multiagency Special Operations Division and the 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 
Fusion Center.100   
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) acknowledged that 
these recommendations were necessary.  The Department of 
Homeland Security responded to the report by stating that 
discussions with the DOJ were continuing and it neither 
overtly agreed nor disagreed with the GAO’s 
recommendations.  Moreover, it identified several areas of 
the report that required further modification.  The GAO did 
not make any revisions to the report.101 
The tenuous relationship that exists among the various 
agencies within the U.S. government, which converge on the 
issue of narcoterrorism, is highlighted in the March 2010 
CRS report on the connection between international 
terrorism and the proliferation of transnational criminal 
networks.  The report aptly points out it is generally 
perceived that most attempts at harnessing interagency 
cooperation are hindered by  
the lack of a U.S. government-wide strategy to 
combat crime-terrorism links and the difficulty 
of quantifying resources devoted to combating 
crime, terrorism, or the combination of the two 
[and] it is at times difficult to assess the 
relative priority an agency may apply to 
counterterrorism and combating transnational 
crime.102   
Varying degrees of collaboration and efforts to focus 
on the issue of narcoterrorism can be seen via such 
governmental entities as the U.S. Departments of State, 
Treasury, Defense and Justice however as articulated in the 
CRS report,  
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It does not appear that DHS has an organization 
or program specifically focused on foreign borne 
risks to the homeland stemming from the 
confluence of terrorism and crime.103   
Therefore, it seems that currently no new agreements 
or levels of cooperation have been established between the 
DOJ and DHS per the recommendations outlined in the 2009 
GAO “Drug Control” report. 
                     
103 Rollins and Wyler, International Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress, 
41. 
 56
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 57
III. THE LINK BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND 
TERRORISM:  COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
A. COLOMBIA: THE ROLE OF LEFTIST GROUPS AND 
PARAMILITARIES IN THE DESTABILIZATION OF THE STATE 
We stand firm in the fight against terrorism and 
firm in our conviction that a sustained and 
permanent victory depends upon the success of 
each individual country in the struggle for 
social cohesion.  In projecting our security 
policy to become an axiom of the State, we 
conceive it to be inexorably linked to the 
constant improvement of the social conditions of 
our people. 104 
— Álvaro Uribe Velez, President of Colombia 
addressing the 60th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly on September 17, 
2005. 
1. Introduction 
Money from the illicit drug trade has increasingly 
helped to finance terrorist and insurgency groups 
worldwide, but perhaps nowhere has this development been 
more significant and palpable than in Colombia.105  In 
recent years, funding derived from the cocaine and heroin 
industry has largely financed the societal upheavals of 
this troubled country.  The primary leftist groups with 
drug connections are the Armed Revolutionary Forces of 
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Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).  
Colombian right-wing terrorists, collectively referred to 
as paramilitaries, also have longstanding ties to drug 
traffickers.  Since 1997, the paramilitaries have often 
been known by the name of their main umbrella organization, 
the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.106 
 
 
Figure 4.   Colombian Coca Cultivation and Size of  
Illegal Armed Groups (FARC and ELN)107 
The drug-related money of these rural-based terrorists 
has come primarily from “taxes” and fees imposed on 
traffickers in return for the protection of illicit crops, 
labs, and shipments.  During the latter part of the 1990s, 
however, the FARC and the AUC became directly involved in 
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drug trafficking.108  For example, these terrorist 
organizations produced and transported drugs—usually 
cocaine in its various stages of processing—and then 
provided the drugs to traffickers in exchange for money and 
arms.109  The majority of the trafficking activity by the 
FARC and the AUC has occurred within Colombia or 
neighboring countries at the early and middle stages of the 
drug pipeline, with traditional criminal syndicates 
continuing to handle distribution and sales in the United 
States and Europe.110  By moving beyond the collection of 
taxes, the two terrorist organizations reaped greater 
profits and were able extend their influence deep into the 
heart of the Colombian state. 
Right-wing terrorists, such as the AUC, have 
traditionally been more prone to engaging in criminal 
economic activity and to forging links with the underworld 
than have their leftist counterparts.  With the demise of 
communism in the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
leftist groups in Colombia increasingly become a hybrid of 
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politics and criminal enterprise.111  This does not mean 
that left-wing insurgents have always cooperated with drug 
traffickers.  Their relationship with the “narcos” has been 
a varied and fluctuating one, containing elements of 
friction and competition as well as cooperation and 
synchronization.  The popular idea of a “narcoterrorist 
alliance” can be misleading.  Still, what is worrisome is 
that these leftist terrorists and drug traffickers, despite 
their differences, have managed to collaborate as much as 
they have contributing to the destabilization of the 
social, economic, and governmental infrastructure of the 
Colombian state.  Through an examination of Colombia’s 
violent history of insurgency and counterinsurgency 
stimulated and fueled by drug trafficking, this case study 
will endeavor to discuss and analyze the relationship of 
left-wing and paramilitaries groups with the Colombian 
state and how these sometimes corrupt associations have 
shaped its national politics, economy and society. 
2. Country Overview 
Colombia is a resource-rich but socially divided 
country, in which the wealth of the urban elite has 
trickled down only modestly to the majority of mixed race 
and rural populations, resulting in a weakened state with a 
history of inter-communal conflict.  Surprisingly, however, 
its democratic institutions remain among the strongest in 
the Andean region, although they have to some extent been 
weakened and undermined by the country's 45-year-old 
revolution, which has set government forces in opposition 
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against two main leftist rebel groups: the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (ELN).  The insecurity triggered by the 
leftist insurgencies was worsened by demobilized right-wing 
paramilitaries reforming into organized crime networks.  
All of the conflicts are fuelled by the proceeds of drug 
trafficking - Colombia is the world's biggest cocaine 
producer, ahead of Peru and Bolivia - and it is the main 
reason behind America’s ongoing commitment of military aid 
to the country.112 
Terrorism expert Peter Waldmann contends that Colombia 
epitomizes a “culture of violence” that reflects the morals 
and customs of its society.  According to Waldmann, the 
lineage of this tradition is profoundly entrenched in the 
annals “of a weak state unable to impose the rule of law, a 
popular tradition of settling private disputes and social 
problems through violence, a small and weak middle class 
unable to extend nonviolent spaces beyond a few pockets of 
major cities, and robust criminal networks with roots deep 
in the Colombian power structure, who place no value on 
human life.”113 
                     
112 "Executive Summary, Colombia," Jane's Online. 
113 Douglas Porch and Maria Jose Rasmussen, "Demobilization of 
Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation Or Transition?" Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 6 (June 2008), 534, 
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/555617_793890206_794121722.pdf 
(accessed August 20, 2010). 
 62
 
Figure 5.   Illegal Armed Groups and Coca Cultivation in 
Colombia, 2008114 
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3. The State’s History of Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency 
It would be a mistake to regard Colombia's long-
standing history of conflict as only a terrorist or drug 
problem.  Nor should it be considered a classic Marxist 
insurgency or counterinsurgency.  It is, rather, a 
combination of all these elements.  The FARC, the AUC, and 
the ELN fought not just the Colombian state, but also each 
other and the country's civil society.  All three groups 
were also, in a sense, criminal gangs: the FARC and the AUC 
supported themselves primarily through the coca and poppy 
industries and ancillary kidnapping, extortion, and 
assassination rackets115; the ELN specialized in kidnapping 
and also regularly targeted Colombia's other major 
resource, oil.116  Colombia's two main rebel movements, the 
aforementioned FARC and the ELN, were founded in the 1960s, 
but their origins lay further back, in la “Violencia.”  
From 1948 to 1963, followers of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties fought a civil war that cost the lives 
of some 200,000 people.117  The appalling violence of the 
period was ostensibly about party politics.  Predominantly 
rural, la Violencia was a volatile and brutal expression of 
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peasant grievances and local disputes.  Weak governmental 
institutions in many localities contributed to the growth 
of armed self-defense groups with varying ideological 
beliefs.  These same factors, along with the added fuel 
provided by revenue from the drug trade, remain central to 
understanding Colombia's contemporary violence. 
La Violencia ended with the creation of the National 
Front in 1958, a pact between Liberal and Conservative 
leaders to form a power-sharing system in which the two 
parties alternated in power and had mutual control of the 
government.  The consequence of this elite arrangement was 
that other political parties and movements were effectively 
excluded from politics, an exclusion enforced by repression 
and tyranny when required.  The armed forces remained 
formally subordinate to civilian rule but exercised near 
autonomy on issues of national security and enjoyed 
impunity despite frequent and serious human rights 
violations.  The National Front officially ended in 1974, 
but the two traditional parties continued to share 
government offices between them into the mid-1980s.118 
Colombia's guerrilla movements arose in resistance to 
the National Front.  Founded in 1966, the FARC developed 
out of rural self-defense groups organized by the Colombian 
Communist Party during la Violencia.  Its leader, Manuel 
"Tirofijo" ("Sureshot") Marulanda, took up arms in 1949 at 
the age of 19.  The ELN was organized by students inspired 
by the example of Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution, and 
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focused its attention on the oil industry, blowing up 
pipelines and kidnapping oil executives for ransom.  In the 
1970s, several new guerrilla groups developed, the most 
important of which was the Movimiento 19 de Abril (April 19 
Movement, M-19), founded in reaction to alleged fraud in 
the 1970 presidential election.119  
During the 1960s and 1970s, Colombia's guerrilla wars 
were low-intensity affairs.  None of the half-dozen 
guerrilla groups (which operated independently) could 
seriously challenge the armed forces for control of the 
state, but neither could the armed forces defeat the 
guerrillas, especially those with a well-established rural 
base.  For three decades, an impasse existed.  
Every Colombian president since Belisario Betancur 
(1982-86) has recognized the need to find a political 
solution to the insurgency.  In 1984, Betancur signed a 
cease-fire with the FARC and M-19, which lasted for about a 
year, despite efforts by the armed forces to subvert it.  
The cease-fire with the M-19 ended when guerrilla commandos 
seized the Palace of Justice and the military assaulted the 
building without presidential authorization, leading to the 
death of 11 Supreme Court justices.120 
The FARC used the cease-fire to test the openness of 
Colombian politics.  In 1985, it organized the Union 
Patriotica (Patriotic Union, UP), which achieved some 
modest electoral success in 1986, winning about a dozen 
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seats in the national legislature and several dozen 
municipal posts.  A wave of repression ensued, in which 
some 3,000 UP activists, candidates, and elected officials 
were murdered by right-wing paramilitary groups, thereby 
eliminating the Patriotic Union as a viable party.  The 
FARC had no incentive to lay down its arms, and the war 
went on.  Presidents Virgilio Barco, Cesar Gaviria, and 
Ernesto Samper all conducted negotiations with various 
guerrilla groups, leading to the demobilization of the M-19 
and several smaller organizations in 1991.  However, talks 
with the FARC and the ELN made no headway, as these larger 
groups refused to settle for amnesty alone, demanding 
negotiations on a fuller agenda of social and economic 
improvements.121 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Colombia's violence became 
more intense and more complex.  Intensification of the war 
was fueled by revenue from the drug trade.  Estimates of 
how much money the FARC raises from taxing drug production 
and commerce in its zones of control vary enormously, from 
a low of about $100 million a year to a high of $500 
million.  Regardless of the amount, there is no doubt drug 
revenue has enabled the FARC to significantly expand its 
ranks, increase its firepower, and extend its area of 
operations.  In 1986, the FARC had about 9,000 combatants 




                     
121 Wolfgang S. Heinz, "Guerrillas, Political Violence and the Peace 
Process in Colombia," The Latin Amercian Research Review 24, no. 3 
(1989), 254-255. 
 67
autonomous units).  By 1999, it had 15,000 combatants on 
some 60 fronts, and was active in 40 percent of Colombia's 
municipalities.122 
The war became more complex with the rise of the 
paramilitary right, or "self-defense" groups, many of which 
made their appearance in the 1980s.  The genesis of the 
paramilitaries was diverse.  Some were organized and 
financed directly by drug traffickers in retaliation for 
guerrilla kidnappings of their relatives.  Others were 
organized by local landowners and mid-level military 
officers intent on eliminating grass-roots activists and 
leftist politicians.  Still others were organized by the 
armed forces as part of a national counterinsurgency 
strategy (that U.S. military advisers helped design) in 
which local self-defense militias would confront the 
guerrillas in areas where the military's presence was 
weak.123 
The paramilitaries flourished as a result of two 
enabling conditions: financing from the drug trade and 
tolerance (and sometimes active assistance) on the part of 
the Colombian armed forces.  Most of the paramilitary 
groups were financed by drug money; they were paid either 
directly by traffickers, engaged in trafficking themselves, 
or by the revenue of taxed drug commerce in areas they 
controlled.  The paramilitaries banded together around the 
leadership of Carlos Castano and his United Self- Defense 
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Forces of Colombia (AUC), an alliance formed in 1997 to 
give the paramilitaries a national political voice and “to 
retaliate against leftist guerillas fighting the Colombian 
government and the landed establishment.”124 
Civilian governments in Colombia have long considered 
the activities of the paramilitaries to be unlawful and 
criminal but have struggled to suppress them until recent 
history due to the close ties these groups have formerly 
enjoyed with the armed forces of the state.  The military 
has a long, well-documented record of condoning and 
collaborating with paramilitary operations.  As the 
military came under mounting pressure and scrutiny from 
national and international human rights groups, the abuses 
by the armed forces were dramatically reduced, but abuses 
by the paramilitaries escalated, prompting some analysts to 
conclude that state-sponsored violence was being 
privatized.125 
By the late 1990s, Colombia's anguish appeared to be 
reaching a point of catastrophe.  The guerrilla war was 
expanding and escalating.  Paramilitary violence against 
suspected leftist sympathizers and other "social 
delinquents" was mounting rapidly.  Kidnappings by 
guerrillas and paramilitaries alike had grown to epidemic 
proportions.  From 1987 to 1997, a rising tide of criminal 
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as well as political violence took the lives of more people 
than were killed in la Violencia.  The government seemed 
unable to provide any degree of personal protection for its 
populace.126 
4. The FARC, the Paramilitaries and the Traffickers:  
Relationships of Convenience and Conflict 
Prior to the cocaine boom, Colombia’s oldest and 
largest terrorist group, the FARC, obtained much of its 
financing from kidnapping, extortion and, to some extent, 
state support.  Although the FARC did not initially seem to 
encourage coca cultivation and cocaine processing in its 
territory—mainly in southern Colombia—it did not register 
opposition.127  The group apparently did not want to risk 
losing the support of peasants employed in those drug 
activities.  The FARC imposed a fixed rate, generally 10 
percent, on coca leaf or paste transactions in return for 
protecting the traffickers from authorities.  Initial 
relations between the FARC and the drug cartels, including 
the Medellín, were mutually beneficial.128  The FARC used 
its connections with traffickers to obtain weapons.  In 
December 1988, Jamaican authorities seized a vessel 
containing 10 tons of arms.  The cache included 1,000 
assault rifles, 250 machine guns, 10 mortars, and 600 
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mortar rounds destined for the FARC.  Interrogation of the 
conspirators revealed that Colombian cocaine dealers who 
worked with the terrorist group had underwritten the 
operation.129 
The late 1980s, however, also brought serious problems 
between the FARC and the drug industry.  First, a violent 
dispute erupted over drug-related “business” issues with 
Medellín cartel member Gonzalo Rodríguez-Gacha.  He 
purchased huge tracts of real estate in northern and 
central Colombia to invest his narco dollars, he came into 
further conflict with the FARC because he pushed the 
peasant populace off the land.  Moreover, his land became 
subject to FARC “revolutionary taxes” and property 
requisitions.  Other traffickers had trouble with the FARC 
because of land acquisition, but none more so than 
Rodríguez-Gacha, who reportedly became Colombia’s biggest 
private landowner.  The Medellín drug lord already had 
numerous gunmen (“sicarios”) on his payroll, but needed 
additional strength against the FARC.  He infused money and 
resources into small, private armies that legitimate 
cattlemen and landowners had established earlier to fend 
off FARC encroachment.  In addition to providing Rodríguez-
Gacha an alternative to FARC protection for his trafficking 
activity, these paramilitaries, as previously mentioned, 
increasingly became a potent weapon in the hands of the 
political ultra-right, including some members of the armed 
forces and security services.  Revitalized with drug money 
and promoting a violent, anti-communist agenda, the 
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paramilitaries helped to conduct a terrorist campaign of 
assassinations against leftist politicians and other 
civilians sympathetic to the FARC.130 
As the 1980s gave way to a new decade, a rough 
geographic division emerged in the FARC’s relations with 
the narcos: strained relationships mainly in northern and 
central Colombia, where the paramilitaries generally had 
influence and power, but stronger ties in the south, where 
the FARC enjoyed greater strength in the immense 
countryside.  Highlighting this regional dichotomy, a 
Colombian specialist on terrorism has noted that Rodríguez-
Gacha  
“allied himself with the army” against the FARC 
in the strategic Middle Magdalena region (in 
central Colombia), while his partners in the 
Medellín cartel “simultaneously” gave arms to the 
FARC to “protect airstrips and drug processing 
plants in the southwestern plains from the 
army.131 
5. The Involvement of the FARC and Paramilitaries in 
the Illicit Drug Trade 
 As previously emphasized, drugs in Colombia are 
perhaps the greatest factor in the political and social 
instability of the country.  All sub-state armed groups in 
Colombia have primarily funded their activities with 
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illegal incomes.  Changes in the dynamics of the Colombian 
drug trade in the 1990s helped set the stage for both the 
FARC and the right-wing paramilitaries to earn a greater 
amount of money from that source.  The timing was 
especially fortuitous for the FARC.  The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the intensification of Cuba’s economic 
woes curtailed whatever aid was still flowing in from those 
governments. 
A Colombian government offensive against the Medellín 
cartel, which controlled 80 percent of the cocaine 
business, claimed the lives of its top leaders, Rodríguez-
Gacha and Pablo Escobar and severely, disrupted their 
empire.  The rival Cali cartel rapidly filled Medellín’s 
place in the market.  Cali’s preeminence was short-lived, 
however.  Under intense pressure from Washington because of 
revelations that he accepted Cali cartel money as a 
candidate in 1994, President Ernesto Samper cracked down on 
the Cali drug lords and, albeit reluctantly, jailed many of 
them.132 
Although the fall of these two narco empires had 
little impact on the overall flow of cocaine to the United 
States, it led to a more diffuse trafficking system 
composed of numerous, smaller networks.  Often lacking 
their own extensive resources, these newer trafficking 
rings relied very heavily on FARC and paramilitary 
protection.  With the proliferation of trafficking 
networks, a smaller, left-wing Colombian terrorist group, 
the National Liberation Army (ELN), which specialized in 
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extorting money from oil companies, increasingly 
supplemented its income by taxing the drug business.133 
When Colombia catapulted from third place into first 
among Andean coca producers the FARC, in particular, gained 
greater access to drug money.  As a result of Colombia’s 
neighbors’ actions—Perú’s air bridge crackdown and 
Bolivia’s tougher stance against coca cultivation—Colombian 
coca production more than doubled between 1995 and 2000.134  
Most of this increase occurred in the southern regions of 
Guaviare, Caquetá, and Putumayo, FARC bastions where 
peasant cultivators of coca have provided the group with 
its strongest rural base of support ever.135  Not to be 
outdone, the paramilitaries expanded southward, partly to 
wrest control of coca cultivation from the FARC.136  As the 
FARC's sphere of influence expanded, the state’s military 
forces responded by backing the violent paramilitaries, 
particularly the United Self-Defense Forces (USDFC), lead 
by Carlos Castano who was a former deputy to drug lord 
Pablo Escobar.   
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In August 1997, the USDFC reliance on cocaine was 
confirmed with the seizure of a complex of four 
sophisticated labs and 700 kilograms of finished 
cocaine in Cundinamarca.137 
In addition, in the 1990s Colombia moved into heroin 
production, using opium cultivated principally in the 
southwestern areas of Tolima, Huila, and Cauca.  Heroin 
from Colombia quickly captured a sizeable share of the U.S. 
east-coast market.  By mid-decade, a close correlation 
existed between poppy cultivation and areas of FARC or 
paramilitary control, mainly the former.138 
In 1998, the Colombian government estimated that money 
from the drug trade was the single greatest source of 
income for the country’s terrorist groups, on both the left 
and the right. That year, they reportedly earned a total of 
US$551 million from drug links, US$311 million from 
extortion, and US$236 million from kidnapping.139  In the 
case of the FARC’s income that year, the government 
estimated that 48 percent came from drug sources, 36 
percent from extortion, 8 percent from kidnapping, 6 
percent from cattle rustling, and the remainder from bank 
robbery and other illegal activities.140 
The size of the group’s war chest explains why it has 
been able to pay its new recruits three times more than the 
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Colombian army pays its new soldiers.141  The FARC had an 
estimated 7,000 active members organized into 60 fronts in 
1995; by 2000, it had 15,000–20,000 in more than 70 
fronts.142 
 
INCOME PESOS USD % 










Kidnapping 256,400,000,000 91.6 million 6.75
Earnings from investments 115,440,158,884 41.2 million 3.04
Cattle rustling 52,668,700,000 18.8 million 1.39
Theft of hydrocarbons 42,000,000,000 15 million 1.11
Tax on coca base 20,256,812,400 7.2 million 0.53
Taxes on illegal airstrips 7,154,100,000 2.55 million 0.19
Bank robbery 2,780,073,527 992,000 0.07
Protection of crystallizing 
drug labs 2,621,469,840 936,000 0.07
Security for coca leaf 953,261,760 340,000 0.01
Protection of coca base 
laboratories 886,235,543 316,000 
- 
0.1 
Security of coca fields 541,626,000 193,000 - 0.1 
Material captured from security 
forces 152,500,232 54,000 
- 
0.1 
Table 1.   2005 FARC Income143 
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In Colombia’s post-cartel drug market, the AUC was an 
unusual organization.  While many Latin American drug 
traffickers, small Colombian drug producers and the FARC 
did not participate in all aspects of the drug market, “the 
paramilitaries’ drug business [was] vertically integrated 
throughout the chain of production, from control over crops 
to international distribution.”144  The AUC acquired 30 
percent of its income from contributions and donations—
mostly protection payments from the landholding elite — and 
70 percent from drug activities, though estimates of the 
net amount of this income varied from $20 million to $200 
million.  The AUC grew, refined, and domestically moved its 
own cocaine, and even trafficked its drugs to international 
markets.  While the FARC taxed coca farmers operating 
within its territories, the AUC established ownership of 
the land to engage in coca production.  To gain a foothold 
in a drug-producing region, the AUC offered lower taxes and 
better buy rates than did the FARC.  However, “once they 
penetrate[d] an area, the paramilitaries start[ed] up their 
own crops and displace[d] farmers and peasants.”145 
6. The Road to Diplomatic Negotiations Is Paved With 
Good Intentions: The State’s Tenuous Relationship 
With the Left and the Right 
On November 7, 1998, with the hope of negotiating a 
peace settlement and bring about an end to the ongoing 
Colombian armed conflict, President Andrés Pastrana granted 
the FARC a 42,000 km2 (16,200 mi2) safe haven, centered 
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around the San Vicente del Caguán settlement,  and which 
was intended to serve as a confidence building measure.146   
 
 
Figure 6.   2000 Map of FARC Demilitarized Zone147 
Diplomatic relations between the Government of 
President Pastrana and the FARC guerrilla forces from 
January 7, 1999 to February 20, 2002, are generally 
regarded as a failed attempt at peaceful negotiations.  
After a series of high-profile guerrilla terrorist actions, 
including the hijacking of an aircraft, attacks on several 
small towns and cities, and the kidnapping of several 
prominent political figures, Pastrana ended the peace talks 
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on February 21, 2002, and ordered Colombian armed forces to 
begin retaking the FARC controlled zone.148 
For most of the period between 2002 and 2005, the FARC 
was believed to be in a strategic withdrawal due to 
increasing military and police actions of President Álvaro 
Uribe, which led to the capture or desertion of many 
fighters and medium-level commanders.  Uribe ran for office 
on an anti-FARC platform and was determined to defeat 
guerilla insurgency in a bid to create "confidence" in the 
country.  Uribe's own father had been killed by the FARC in 
an attempted kidnapping in 1983.149  In 2004, President 
Uribe launched a large-scale military operation called 
"Patriot Plan" involving 15,000 government soldiers who 
pushed into FARC- controlled territory in an attempt to 
wrest part of the countryside from rebel hands and capture 
key guerilla leaders.  The plan forced the FARC to retreat 
and lose territory they had controlled for decades.  
However, the Patriot Plan was limited in the success of its 
objective to capture key FARC leaders and produced 
apprehension since most of the group's top leaders were 
driven deeper into hiding.150 
By 2005, President Uribe's efforts to increase 
pressure on the FARC appeared to have some partial success, 
decreasing the intensity of attacks on Government forces.  
However, statistics demonstrated that while the intensity 
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of attacks had decreased the frequency of clashes remained 
the same.  There was a resurgence of violence in early 2005 
when 50 Colombian soldiers were killed in the month of 
February.  Moreover in 2005, three Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) members who were awaiting final sentencing for 
training the FARC on IRA bomb tactics fled Colombian 
custody only to resurface in Ireland.  They were detained 
and questioned by the Irish national police and released 
without charge.  The Colombian government requested their 
extradition unfortunately Ireland does not have an 
extradition treaty with Colombia and the case remains under 
review and the three fugitives at large.151 
In November 2007, President Uribe agreed to a request 
of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Colombian Senator 
Piedad Cordoba, to act as intermediaries for a possible 
"humanitarian exchange" of FARC-held hostages for FARC 
prisoners in Colombian jails. The Colombian government-
sanctioned effort ended in November after Chavez and 
Cordoba repeatedly failed to adhere to Colombia's 
guidelines.  Nevertheless, Chavez continued his efforts to 
gain the release of hostages including a failed effort at 
year's end involving the promised release of three 
Colombian hostages (Clara Rojas, her son Emmanuel, and 
Consuelo Gonzales de Perdomo) to an international 
delegation that included former-Argentine President Nestor 
Kirchner.  The Colombian government revealed that the FARC 
had turned over Emmanuel to a sympathizer, who had in turn 
placed the child in Colombian social services.  Confusion 
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over Emmanuel's whereabouts coupled with the FARC 
allegations that the Colombian military was operating in 
the area led the FARC to temporarily call off the release.  
The FARC, under intense public pressure, eventually turned 
over Rojas and Gonzales to President Chavez.152 
In March 2008, Colombia forces mounted a raid against 
the FARC in Ecuador, leading to the capture of laptop 
computers and other intelligence.  The raid resulted in an 
immediate regional crisis over the apparent Colombian 
violation of Ecuadoran sovereignty, with both Ecuador and 
Venezuela mobilizing military forces.  The Colombian 
authorities initially suggested that the raid had been 
conducted with Ecuadoran approval, but later appeared to 
back away from this assertion.  In return, Colombian 
authorities claimed the intelligence recovered provided 
evidentiary documentation that there were verifiable links 
between the governments of both Ecuador and Venezuela and 
the FARC.  The crisis and potential military confrontation 
were later resolved, but an investigation continued into 
the allegations of regional support for the FARC.153 
President Uribe can also point to success in 
confronting the right-wing paramilitaries.  Since December 
2002, the paramilitary groups adopted a cease-fire and 
entered into peace negotiations with the Colombian.  In 
2003 after the announced cease-fire, the AUC, in accordance 
with promises made during negotiations with the government, 
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begun to demobilize some its forces.  In 2006, 4000 AUC 
soldiers turned in their weapons to government officials 
and disbanded from the illegal paramilitary group.  While 
the AUC appears to be losing power, it has been heavily 
debated whether they have in fact gained influence and 
power over the region.  The group, which had selected 
mayoral, governor, and council representatives in regions 
they had strong influence, claimed in 2006 to have control 
of 30% of the Colombian Congress.154  In addition to playing 
a strong role in Colombian politics, the AUC has threatened 
to halt the ceasefire and demobilization unless the 
government adopts amnesty terms acceptable to the 
paramilitary group’s leaders.  A major point of contention 
was the abolishment of laws allowing for AUC members to be 
extradited and detained in the United States.  By 2007, as 
a result of a large demobilization process vigorously 
pursued by President Uribe, most of the AUC's centralized 
military structure had been dismantled, and all of the top 
paramilitary chiefs had stepped down with the majority 
being held in a maximum security facility.155 
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Figure 7.   Demobilizations During the Presidency of 
Alvaro Uribe (August 2002–August 2006)156 
The smaller of the left-wing rebel groups, the ELN, 
has been engaged in tentative dialogue with the Colombian 
government since late 2006, but a formal peace process 
remains elusive.  After abandoning talks with a Mexican 
intermediary, the ELN began preliminary talks with the 
Colombian government in December 2005 in Cuba.  The group 
continued to fight but had limited resources and dwindling 
membership.  The ELN had its first mass desertion in June 
2006, when a 29-person unit surrendered to officials.  In 
2006, it conducted several rounds of peace talks, but no 
agreements were reached.  The group remained in the field, 
but with limited resources, a dwindling membership, and 
reduced offensive capability.  In addition, during this 
time period the ELN and FARC routinely clashed over 
territory in northeastern Colombia, which further weakened 
this leftist guerilla insurgency.157  Peace talks between 
the government of Colombia and the ELN remained stalled 
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throughout 2008 due to ELN unyieldingness.  International 
and local efforts to persuade the ELN back to the 
negotiating table—including efforts by former ELN leader 
Antonio Bermúdez (“Francisco Galán”), who announced his 
resignation from the group to focus on peace talks in 2008—
made little progress. The ELN remained in the field, but 
with reduced resources, a declining membership base of 
approximately 2,000 fighters, and reduced offensive 
capability.  In spite of these set-backs, the group still 
managed to inflict casualties on the Colombian military 
through increased use of land mines and it continued to 
fund its operations through narcotics trafficking.  
Numerous ELN fronts increased their drug trafficking 
activities in an effort to curtail the losses suffered by 
the Colombian government and the FARC.   
In the longer term, the ELN faces the prospect of 
extinction as its remaining framework, as an 
ideologically-inspired insurgency, is either 
effectively merged with the FARC or evolves into 
criminal networks.  Clashes with FARC insurgents 
in the eastern Arauca region bordering Venezuela 
in May 2010 underscored the ongoing localized 
hostilities with the larger insurgent group. 158 
The Colombian state is today challenged by the 
formation of criminal gangs formed by demobilized 
paramilitaries and other individuals.  Unlike the AUC, the 
new criminal factions make little claim to fighting 
insurgents and are more clearly illicit ventures 
concentrated primarily on drug trafficking, other lucrative 
illegal activities, and manipulating regional politics to 
promote their illegal enterprises.   
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These new criminal groups are not a reconstituted 
AUC, but they recruit heavily from the pool of 
former AUC members.  A large part of their 
leadership appears to be former mid-level 
paramilitary commanders who did not participate 
in demobilization.159 
7. Conclusion 
The aforementioned history of the Colombian state 
reveals a legacy of violence and corruption.  It also 
exposes how difficult it has been for the Colombian state 
to consolidate its authority.  Initially, guerilla 
insurgency groups challenged central-state rule, and later, 
regional paramilitaries did the same.  Drug traffickers 
have played a central but not exclusive role in this 
process.  The state's inability to integrate the left-wing 
guerrilla movements as members of the polity or to defend 
the ranchers, merchants, landowners, and businessmen from 
rebel violence led to the formation of the AUC - sponsored 
at first by drug traffickers and then by other business 
groups, and facilitated by the military resistance to the 
presidency's dialogue with the leftist guerrillas.  The 
emergence of the AUC suggests that the near-monopoly of the 
means of coercion by the state is the result of a social 
process and is not an inherent attribute of state 
organization.  It further reveals that state capacities are 
not absolute, but relational.  It is not merely a question 
of strength but also of the potential of the different 
social divisions to collaborate with or defy state 
intercession. 
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To be both a developing nation and one ravaged by 
violent conflict is a challenging scenario for any country 
to face.  Colombia’s newly inaugurated President, Juan 
Manuel Santos, must continue to embrace a spectrum of 
political views and ideas on how to resolve its complex 
issues.  It is essential for the current administration to 
continue to implement the policies of President Uribe, with 
a strong emphasis on combating the illicit drug trade and 
guerrilla insurgency so as not to revert to the tradition 
of violence that the country has known for far too long and 
which has eroded the social and political foundations of 
the state.  The creation of rebel groups has represented, 
on some level, a failure of the Colombian government to 
completely address the needs of a significant segment of 
its citizenry.  Therefore, the country’s leadership will 
need to continue to resolve this dilemma if there is to be 
any hope of solving the myriad of challenges that lie ahead 
for the Colombian state and maintain the course of 
resurrecting itself from the ashes of violence and 
oppression. 
B. TURKEY:  CONVERGENCE OF TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 
THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE KURDISTAN WORKERS PARTY (PKK) 
The cooperation between the PKK and Kurdish 
criminal clans has been similar to the 
cooperation among Sicilian mafia families.  The 
PKK is a multilevel business organization that is 
involved in all phases of the narcotics trade, 
from production to retail distribution.  
 — Turkish security officer160 
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Academics and researchers alike have long acknowledged 
that terrorist groups have engaged in transnational 
organized criminal endeavors to further their cause to 
include weapons and drug trafficking, immigrant smuggling, 
and money laundering.161  This case study will continue to 
examine the central theme of this thesis, the convergence 
of terrorism and drug trafficking, through the lens of the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan: PKK) 
by analyzing its involvement in the illicit narcotics trade 
which has been used to finance their terror agenda.  The 
PKK, along with the aforementioned Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), is one of only a few 
organizations worldwide designated by the U.S. government 
as both a terrorist organization and a significant foreign 
narcotics trafficker.162 
Established as a separatist insurgency in 1984, the 
PKK — now known as the People's Congress of Kurdistan, or 
Kongra-Gel (KGK) - has caused tremendous social upheaval in 
Turkey spanning a period of several decades.  Its legacy is 
one of violence and bloody insurrection.  It is also widely 
considered the country’s most influential terrorist 
organization.  It has not only victimized more than 30,000  
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non-combatants and security personnel since the inception 
of its armed wing in 1984, but has also stifled the Turkish 
economy.163 
In May 2003, Steven W. Casteel, the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) assistant administrator for 
intelligence, testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee regarding the phenomenon of international drug 
trafficking and terrorism.  Casteel stated:  
The Government of Turkey consistently reports 
that the PKK, as an organization, is responsible 
for much of the illicit drug processing and 
trafficking in Turkey.  Turkish press reports 
state that the PKK produces 60 tons of heroin per 
year and receives an estimated income of forty 
million dollars each year from drug trafficking 
proceeds.164   
From the DEA's own intelligence report, Casteel added 
that evidence showed that among the PKK's modes of drug-
profiteering were producing opium, taxing traffickers who 
pass through their cross-border territories, and "possibly 
controlling a significant portion of the heroin markets in 
Europe."165 
The PKKs activity in the international drug trade is 
hardly a new phenomenon.  The PKK has reportedly financed 
its Kurdish nationalist aspirations through the illegal 
drug trade since as early as the 1980s, participating in 
every stage of the supply chain from processing to 
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marketing.166  Indeed, Interpol data reveals that the PKK 
managed close to 80 percent of the European illegal drug 
market by 1992 and other sources similarly indicate that 
they controlled between 60 to 70 percent of this same 
market in 1994.167  Currently, 80 percent of the European 
illicit drug market reportedly flows from the PKK-
controlled Turkish narcotics sector.168     
 
Figure 8.   2010 UNODC Breakdown of Heroin Flows to 
Europe169 
The PKK was added by the U.S. State Department to its 
list of terrorist organizations in October 1997, and as 
late as May 2002 was included on the European Union’s (EU) 
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list of foreign terrorist organizations.170  It was renamed 
the Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK) 
in 2001.171  On November 14, 2003, the State Department 
reaffirmed the group’s status as a foreign terrorist 
organization by declaring, “The PKK/KADEK under any alias, 
is a terrorist organization, and no name change or press 
release can alter that fact.”172 
2. Country Overview 
Modern Turkey was founded in 1923 from the Anatolian 
remnants of the defeated Ottoman Empire by national hero 
Mustafa Kemal, who was later honored with the title Atatürk 
or "Father of the Turks."173  Under his authoritarian 
leadership, the country adopted wide-ranging social, legal, 
and political reforms.  After a period of one-party rule, 
an experiment with multi-party politics led to the 1950 
election victory of the opposition Democratic Party and the 
peaceful transfer of power.  Since then, Turkish political 
parties have multiplied, but democracy has been fractured 
by periods of instability and intermittent military coups 
(1960, 1971, 1980), which in each case eventually resulted 
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in a return of political power to civilians.174   In 1997, 
the military again helped engineer the ousting of the then 
Islamic-oriented government, popularly dubbed a "post-
modern coup."175  
For a decade preceding the November 2002 general 
elections, Turkey was governed by a succession of fractious 
coalitions, which were characterized by persistent 
allegations of corruption and which conspicuously failed to 
curb soaring inflation, create employment or provide 
economic stability.176  In February 2001, a run on the 
Turkish lira generated the worst economic recession in 
Turkey since the Second World War.177  Widespread public 
disillusion with the existing political parties coincided 
with the foundation of the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi: AKP) in August 2001.178  The 
AKP had its roots in the Turkish Islamist movement.  Most 
of its founding members belonged to a younger generation of 
Islamists who had broken away to form their own party after 
the Turkish secular courts closed down first the Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi: RP) and then its successor the Virtue 
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Party (Fazilet Partisi: FP).179  However, the relative youth 
of the AKP's founders meant that few had served in the 
government and were thus untainted by the aforementioned 
parties’ track record in power.  They were led by Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, who had been mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 
1998.180  Following the foundation of the AKP, Erdogan 
repeatedly disavowed the radicalism of his youth, declaring 
that the AKP was a “conservative democracy” rather than an 
Islamist party and committed himself to working within the 
secular system.181 
Turkey's location between Europe and the Middle East, 
its position on the energy corridor carrying exports of oil 
and natural gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia to 
western European markets182, and its status as the only 
secular Muslim country and (along with Albania) the only 
predominantly Muslim member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)183, all ensure that it will remain a 
geo-strategically pivotal state on the world stage.   
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Figure 9.   Map of Turkey and the Surrounding Region184 
However, the election of the moderate Islamist Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, and its re-election in 
2007 and again in 2009, raised questions about the future 
not only of secularism in Turkey but the country's Western-
oriented foreign policy, particularly after fading hopes of 
imminent European Union (EU) membership were dealt another 
blow by the EU decision in December 2006 to suspend 
negotiations on eight of the 33 chapters of the accession 
process.185  Meanwhile, the failure to meet the cultural and 
political expectations of the country's Kurdish minority 
continues to fuel a violent campaign by the PKK, which in 
turn is exacerbating the dramatic disparity between living 
standards and socio-economic conditions in the 
predominantly Kurdish southeast and the rest of the  
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country, not to mention creating tensions with Iraqi Kurds 
over the presence of the PKK's main bases and camps in 
northern Iraq.186  
 
Table 2.   Results of 2009  Turkish Municipal 
Elections187 
3. Origins of the Terrorist Movement 
"Kongra-Gel" is the latest in a long series of names 
for the PKK.  Established in 1974 as a Kurdish Marxist-
Leninist group by Abdullah Ocalan (currently serving a life 
sentence for treason against the Turkish state), the 
organization's use of violence has vacillated over time.  
Initially, the PKK sought the establishment of an 
independent Marxist-Leninist Kurdish state and in its 
foundation statement made reference to the liberation of 
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Kurds scattered throughout Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq.188  
More recently it claims to focus on the long-term objective 
of securing a bi-national Turkish-Kurdish state, however 
many experts contend that this is merely a rouse to 
proliferate the expansion of socialism in Eurasia, “a  
Kurdish state was never the ultimate goal, but rather its 
aim was to use this as a subterfuge to spread socialism in 
the region.”189  
The founder of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, attended 
Ankara University as a student of political science.  He 
was inspired by the revolutionary leftist ideas of the 
Turkish People’s Liberation Army and became a member of the 
left-wing Revolutionary Youth Organization.  However, he 
soon came to believe, like many radical activists of the 
period, that even the Turkish left wing was unwilling to 
support the Kurdish cause.190  Due to this disillusionment, 
Ocalan subsequently abandoned the Turkish leftist movement 
and established his own fundamentalist faction that called 
for Kurdish independence and the creation of a separate, 
autonomous Kurdish State.191 
In the southern Turkish city of Dyarbakir on November 
27, 1978, the PKK was formally established by six central 
committee members, and their undisputed leader Abdullah 
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Ocalan and his wife.  This meeting is more commonly 
referred to as the First Congress of the PKK.192  The group 
advocated for a communist revolution through the use of 
guerilla warfare with the ultimate goal of creating a 
separate Kurdish state.193 Ocalan was forced to flee Turkey 
following the military coup of 1980.  He took refuge in the 
Syrian-Controlled Bekaa Valley located in East Lebanon, a 
region with a long tradition in the cultivation of illicit 
crops, where he established a PKK training camp.194  The PKK 
orchestrated its Second Congress in Damascus, Syria during 
the period of August 20-25, 1982.   
It was during this meeting that the group decided 
to initiate a violent armed campaign in order to 
further its goal of establishing an independent 
Kurdish state.195 
The PKK began its guerilla war against the Turkish 
government in 1984.196  It launched its insurgency in August 
1984 attacking police stations in southeast Turkey.197  
Following successful attacks against Turkish security 
forces it shifted its activities from rural to urban 
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targets.198  Among its tactics were suicide bombings, car 
bombs, kidnapping foreign tourists, attacking Turkish 
diplomats in Europe, as well as symbolic representatives of 
the Turkish state in the Southeast, such as teachers.199   
It was with the commencement of this armed terror campaign 
that officials began to realize the rapidly escalating 
threat the PKK posed to the Turkish state.  
4. The PKK’s Involvement in the Illicit Drug Trade 
A decade after its initial strike, the PKK became 
arguably one of the most robust and prolific terrorist 
groups operating in the Middle East and Europe with its 
active cadres of tens of thousands of guerrillas and 
several hundred thousand supporters.200  Its broad offensive 
campaigns required enormous financial support.  As in the 
case with Colombia’s FARC, the lure of a sizeable income 
entices many terrorist organizations to engage in illicit 
drug trafficking to finance their activities.  The PKK is 
no exception to this trend.   
The PKK has long been suspected of substantial 
involvement in drug trafficking, particularly of 
heroin, which is believed to have become a more 
important source of income after state support 
was withdrawn...The war in Iraq is also believed 
to have further facilitated this source of 
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income, as substantial amounts of heroin formerly 
transiting Iran are now re-routed through Iraq.201   
In October 2009, as a result of the PKK's increasing 
activity in the international illicit drug trade, the U.S. 
Treasury Department designated three of the group’s leaders 
as “significant foreign narcotics traffickers.”202    
Narcotics smuggling constitutes a major part of the 
PKK's financial system, alongside extortion, blackmailing, 
robbery, arms smuggling and illicit labor trafficking.  It 
is actively engaged in all phases of narcotics trafficking, 
from the producing and processing of the drugs to their 
smuggling and marketing.  The revenue generated from 
illicit drug trafficking is channeled to fund its arms 
purchases, which in-turn is used to sustain its terrorist 
activities.203  The PKK finances its operations in large 
part through a combination of “revolutionary taxes” imposed 
on the Kurdish population and its dealings in the global 
heroin trade.204  While the PKK's participation in the  
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trafficking of illegal narcotics is undeniable, the precise 
extent of their involvement in this illicit trade is 
uncertain.   
According to Interpol's records in Ankara, 298 
people connected with the PKK were arrested for 
drug trafficking between 1984 and 1993.  More 
than half the arrests were made in Germany.  The 
Turkish police believe that drug trafficking has 
become more important to the PKK since then.  In 
2005, 10,283 kg of heroin was seized in Turkey, 
according to the 2007 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report.205    
The PKKs involvement with illegal narcotics in many 
ways stems from Turkey's position as a pivotal transit 
route for Southwest Asian opiates flowing into Europe.206  
Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever emphasize this point in a case 
study that examines how the PKK funds terrorism through 
organized crime,    
The PKK has been able to take advantage of 
Turkey’s central location for conducting 
terrorist and transnational organized criminal 
activities.  Situated at the crossroads of Asia, 
the Middle East, and Europe, and bordering eight 
countries, including Iran, Iraq, Georgian 
Armenia, Syria, Greece, Bulgaria, and Azerbaijan, 
Turkey offers the PKK access to 5,000 miles of 
coastline as well.207 
Turkey's position astride the "Balkan route" has made 
it somewhat effortless for the PKK to capitalize on its 
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geographical fortune.  Via this route, the PKK 
clandestinely traffics morphine base and heroin from Iran, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan into Turkey traversing its eastern 
borders.   
 
 
Figure 10.   Map of the Northern and Balkan Drug 
Trafficking Routes208 
Since the late 1980s, the PKK has been involved in 
every aspect of the drug trade from production to 
smuggling. 
The terrorist organization has, instead of 
trafficking externally produced heroin, opted for 
a more profitable way of producing heroin from 
non-heroin opiates.  To this end, the PKK refines 
base morphine into heroin in mobile laboratories 
near Istanbul and in the southeastern parts of 
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cannabis in the Bekaa Valley (Lebanon) and in the 
isolated regions of southeastern Anatolia and 
northern Iraq.209 
5. The State’s Response to the Insurgency:  
A Hard-Line Approach to the Threat 
From the outset, the Turkish government assumed an 
unyielding posture toward the insurgency.  “Rooted in the 
decades-old position that the Kurds did not really exist, 
the state sought a military solution.”210 By 1980, Turkey's 
internal security situation had deteriorated markedly.  The 
PKKs violence had extended to Turkish government personnel, 
rival organizations, and dissidents within the PKK's own 
ranks.  Largely due to the destabilizing influence of 
terrorism on Turkey's social, political, and economic 
spheres, on September 12, 1980, General Kenan Evren, chief 
of the Military General Staff, seized power, suspended the 
constitution, dissolved the Assembly, proclaimed martial 
law, and installed a military-civilian cabinet.211  From 
1978 to 1982, the Turkish National Security Council 
recorded approximately 43,000 incidents of terrorism In 
Turkey and an average of 28 terrorist-related deaths per 
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day.212  Until November 1983, the nation remained under 
martial law and Evren held the presidency for a seven-year 
term.   
Turkey pursued hard-line tactics toward the PKK’s (and 
other separatist groups) violent insurgency following the 
military’s assumption of power.  Increased numbers of 
security forces were mobilized in a government campaign of 
mounting intensity.  However, the government’s stance 
toward Kurdish nationalists only fuelled the ire of the 
PKK’s supporters and the military’s “scorched-earth” 
strategy turned a considerable portion, if not most, of the 
populace of the Kurdish areas into vigorous antagonists of 
the state.   
The often brutal methods of the Turkish security 
forces, including widespread human rights abuses 
and the use of death squads to kill suspected 
Kurdish nationalists, ensured that the PKK 
retained a strong following among Turkey’s 
Kurds.213   
One wing of the PKK, which eluded the authorities 
during the military coup of 1980, escaped and re-grouped in 
Syria under the protection of its government.214  Abdullah 
Ocalan took up residence in Damascus, Syria.  Another 
faction of the PKK settled in Germany.  While consolidating 
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its position in the Bekaa Valley, and West Germany, the PKK 
strengthened its resolve to wage guerrilla warfare by 
organizing a military wing, the Kurdistan Freedom Brigade 
(Hazen Rizgariya Kurdistan: HRK).215  
During the mid-1990s, the Turkish security forces 
gradually seized the initiative in southeast Turkey,  
more aggressive battlefield tactics and a 
scorched earth policy — which included the razing 
of an estimated 3,500 villages—enabled the 
Turkish military to regain control of the 
countryside.216   
In 1998, with the PKK in retreat on the battlefield, 
the government turned its attention to Syria.  In the fall 
of 1998, the Turkish military massed 10,000 troops on the 
border with Syria and threatened to invade unless the 
Syrian government expelled Ocalan and withdrew its support 
for the PKK.217  “On October 20, 1998, Syria signed an 
agreement with Turkey designating the PKK as a terrorist 
organization.  Ocalan was forced to leave Syria.”218 
After several failed attempts to take refuge in the 
Netherlands, Italy and Russia (no European country would 
grant him asylum) Ocalan arrived in Greece, a rival to 
Turkey and supporter of the PKK.  His contacts within the 
Greek intelligence services arranged for him to be 
transported to the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.  
However, in a joint operation between the U.S. Central 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Turkish National 
Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı:  
MIT), and the Israeli Institute for Intelligence and 
Special Operations (HaMossad leModi'in uleTafkidim 
Meyuchadim: Mossad), Ocalan’s movements were tracked to the 
Greek diplomatic compound and on February 15, 1999 he was 
apprehended and brought back to Turkey to stand trial.219  
On June 29, 1999, Ocalan was found guilty of multiple 
charges of insurrection and sentenced to death.  The 
punishment was automatically commuted to life imprisonment 
when Turkey abolished the death penalty in August 2002, 
which, according to some foreign policy analysts, was done 
“in order to improve its chances of being accepted into the 
EU, which opposes the death penalty.”220 Since 1999, Ocalan 
has been the sole inmate on the prison island of Imrali in 
the Sea of Marmara.  He is kept in isolation and can 
communicate only with the outside world through visits from 
relatives and his lawyers.  However, he has continued to 
determine strategy for the PKK from his prison cell, 
communicating with the organization through his lawyers—
conversations that are both monitored by the Turkish 
intelligence service and published on the Internet by pro-
PKK websites.221  Ocalan's isolation has arguably enhanced 
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the reverence with which he is regarded by PKK members, 
adding a mystique to his already iconic status and endowing 
him with the image of a living martyr. 
The PKK continued to conduct operations following 
Ocalan's expulsion from Syria and his capture and return to 
Turkey.  However, Ocalan's escape and eventual imprisonment 
ruptured the chain of command within the organization and 
severely damaged its already deteriorating morale.  PKK 
activity continued at a relatively low level until August 
1999 when Ocalan announced an indefinite unilateral 
ceasefire commencing September 1, 1999.222 
6. The Current Situation and Conclusions 
While the PKK's use of violence has subsided, it still 
maintains an active armed wing—and it was this wing that, 
after seizing control of the group in 2004, annulled the 
PKK's five-year-long cessation of hostilities, declared by 
Ocalan in 1999 following his arrest.  Since June 2004, the 
PKK has pursued a two front strategy comprising a rural 
insurgency in southeastern Turkey and an urban bombing 
campaign in the west of the country.  Both are primarily 
designed to exert political leverage in the hope of forcing 
concessions such as greater Kurdish autonomy from the 
Turkish State rather than seizing territory or achieving a 
military victory.  For propaganda purposes, responsibility 
for the bombing campaign has frequently been claimed by an 
organization calling itself the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons  
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(Tayrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan: TAK).223  In reality, TAK is 
comprised of PKK militants under the overall command of its 
Executive Committee.224 
In the absence of a state sponsor, the PKK appears 
unlikely to be able to increase its military capabilities 
either to the levels of the early 1990s or to the point 
where it poses a military threat to the Turkish state.  
Nevertheless, it has the capacity to continue to inflict 
casualties.225  In addition, the group appears to have no 
difficulty in attracting new recruits.  “Turkish 
intelligence sources report that around one half of the 
4,500 to 5,000 PKK militants currently under arms in Turkey 
and in the Qandil mountains have joined the organization 
since 1999.”226  Similarly, although it lacks the means to 
procure sophisticated weaponry, the PKK appears to have the 
benefit of adequate fiscal means to continue its rural 
insurgency at its current level almost indefinitely.  The 
U.S. designations of the PKK and its subordinate entities 
underscore that it operates as more of a hybrid terrorist 
and drug-trafficking cartel than a conventional terrorist 
organization.   
Having received unequivocal backing from voters in the 
constitutional referendum, the governing Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has moved to address Turkey’s 
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structural problems, most notably the Kurdish question, 
through a combination of domestic measures, as well as 
regional and international diplomacy.  The resolution of 
the Kurdish issue has been one of the main targets of the 
AKP government.  The AKP first sought to address this issue 
through domestic political reforms in the early 2000’s, 
also benefiting from the relative calm prevailing in 
southeastern Anatolia, thanks to the outlawed PKK 
suspending its operations.227 However, granting greater 
cultural rights to the Kurds as part of Turkey’s European 
Union accession process or devising socio-economic policies 
proved to be ineffective.  The threat posed by the PKK’s 
separatist terrorism lingered, as the organization managed 
to maintain its manpower in safe havens in Northern Iraq. 
The PKK’s resumption of its campaign of violence in 
the second half the decade caught Ankara by surprise, 
triggering a heated debate.  Faced with the PKK’s deadly 
attacks against Turkish military outposts from its bases in 
Northern Iraq, the AKP bowed to pressure and considered 
seriously pursuing stronger military measures to tackle 
this problem.  Coordinating its policies with the U.S. and 
the Northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities, the Turkish army 
undertook incursions into Northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK 
militants in the winter of 2007-2008.228   
In 2009, the Turkish government and the Turkish 
General Staff acquiesced to the idea that military action 
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alone against the PKK would not be adequate to eradicate it 
as a terrorist threat.229  The government began an ambitious 
initiative, now known as the National Unity Project, to 
contend with the social and economic disparities in Turkish 
recruitment and to comply with EU demands.  According to 
the U.S. State Department’s 2009 Country Report on 
Terrorism, “Concrete steps within the scope of the Project 
were clearly devised to drain the PKK’s support, by, for 
example, liberalizing laws governing the use of the Kurdish 
language in broadcasting, education, and state buildings; 
reducing the application of counterterrorism laws to non-
violent crimes; and providing legal incentives to bring 
members of the PKK who have not engaged in violence back 
into civil society.”230  Unfortunately, the AKP government 
failed to garner popular and political support for the 
measure, also referred to as the “Kurdish opening.”  The 
government’s mishandling of the opening, coupled with the 
PKK and pro-Kurdish parties’ uncooperative attitude, turned 
the entire Kurdish initiative into a near fiasco.231  
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Figure 11.   PKK Attacks Between July and August 2010232 
PKK violence, however, continued throughout the spring 
and summer of 2010, which exposed the failure of the 
Turkish security apparatus in fighting the PKK formations 
inside and outside of Turkey.  The escalation of the 
conflict was avoided only through the PKK’s declaration of 
a unilateral ceasefire prior to the recent Turkish 
constitutional referendum and was, in part, facilitated by 
various civil society organizations.233  Following this 
referendum, the PKK sent signals that it would resume its 
campaign, unless Turkish security forces halted their 
operations by a self-declared deadline of September 20, 
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2010.234 A deadly mine explosion killing nine civilians on 
September 16 reignited the debate on terrorism.  Though the 
PKK denied its involvement in the attack, it was a stark 
reminder that the PKK remains a potent force that could 
deal a serious blow to Turkey’s security.235   
Faced with the double-edged challenge of resolving the 
Kurdish question and defeating the narcoterrorist threat 
posed by the PKK, the AKP seeks to address these issues 
through diplomatic negotiations.  As part of Turkey’s on-
going effort to achieve a peaceful solution to the problem, 
there have been numerous visits undertaken by cabinet 
members and security officials to neighboring Middle 
Eastern states as well as to the U.S.  On September 28, 
2010, a U.S. delegation led by Lloyd James Austin, 
commanding general of U.S. forces in Iraq, visited Turkey 
to discuss joint efforts.  These cooperative ventures are 
undertaken within the framework of a joint “action plan” 
agreed to in April, 2010 to combat the PKK, and are a 
direct result of the trilateral security mechanism between 
Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq.236  Through closer cooperation 
with the U.S. and the Iraqi Kurds, the action plan would 
assist Turkey in taking stronger military measures to 
eliminate the threat posed by the PKK, which to date have 
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proven ineffective, but which could jeopardize and 
frustrate future diplomatic solutions. 
Although the recent joint initiatives seek to address 
the security aspect posed by the PKK’s terrorist 
activities, security cooperation through the trilateral 
mechanism might be secondary to the AKP government’s agenda 
of exploring a non-military solution to the problem in a 
new political climate.  The goal of the diplomatic 
negotiations is to somehow convince the PKK to extend its 
unilateral ceasefire, halt its operations inside Turkey, 
and transform its non-action into a permanent truce.  Once 
the guns fall silent, the Turkish government hopes to find 
a suitable environment within which it can address the 
Kurdish problem through domestic political reforms.237  The 
crux of the issue is what will happen to the thousands of 
PKK militants?  In this process, the PKK will possibly 
withdraw its forces from Turkey into Northern Iraq.  In the 
most optimistic scenario, PKK militants might voluntarily 
turn themselves in and reintegrate themselves into civilian 
life, if the AKP’s diplomatic solution succeeds.  Since 
this is highly unlikely, Turkey expects the Iraqi Kurds and 
the U.S. to take steps towards the disarmament of these PKK 
militants and eventually end the PKK’s military presence.238  
However, given the uncertainty over the future of Iraq and 
                     
237 "Kurdish Issue Reaches New Threshold in Turkey," Hurriyet Daily 
News and Economic Review Online, sec. Turkey National, September 27, 
2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=kurdish-issue-seizes-
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238 "Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict Or Cooperation?" International 





the U.S. military presence in the region, it might be 
unrealistic to expect either the U.S. or the Iraqi Kurds to 
demilitarize the PKK.  Turkey will still need to maintain 
its operational capability to carry out maneuvers inside 
Iraq, as reflected by the government’s decision to extend 
the Turkish army’s mandate to do so.239  It seems that there 
is no easy choice between the use of force and diplomacy. 
Contending with the PKKs illicit transnational 
activities, which cover the spectrum of terrorism and 
narcotics trafficking, requires increased international 
cooperation.  Greater security collaboration and 
intelligence sharing between Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq and 
enhanced military operations inside Turkey are certainly 
important and may halt the PKK’s terrorist attacks.  
However, in the long term these actions could deliver the 
unintended consequences of fostering further discontent 
amongst Turkey’s Kurdish populace and impede diplomatic 
resolutions.  Nonetheless, given the group's central role 
in European narcotics trafficking, formalizing U.S.-EU-
Turkish efforts, both diplomatic and otherwise, to deal 
with the PKK is in the national and regional security 
interests of all parties concerned. 
 
                     
239 "Iraq Hopes Turkey's Cross-Border Military Operations Limited," 
Xinhuanet.Com English News, sec. World, September 29, 2010, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-09/29/c_13534375.htm 
(accessed October 11, 2010). 
 112
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 113
IV. CONCLUSION 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
The United States and the international community are 
involved in a fierce confrontation against terrorism and, 
to a lesser degree, organized crime.  Theoretically, as the 
two threats to America’s national security collaborate or 
imitate one another, it would be beneficial for the 
government to exploit the lessons gathered from combating 
each style of organization such as the FARC in Colombia and 
the PKK in Turkey.  However in actuality, the threats 
presented by both organized crime and terrorism are 
morphing on a regular basis, and both entities are learning 
to adapt from previous missteps while scrutinizing the 
latest lines of defense created by beleaguered nation 
states.  These adaptable organizations are relentlessly 
confronting the lethargic, state-centric responses to their 
irregular warfare techniques.  Although some terrorist 
organizations are hierarchical in makeup, a cell-based, 
shapeless structure like that of Al Qaeda, which 
decentralizes power and authority to self-sufficient or 
semi-independent groups spanning many countries, is more 
representative of the structure of most transnational 
terrorist organizations.  Such structures radically 
increase the difficulties associated with government 
efforts at combating these groups. 
Michael Kenney, assistant professor of public policy 
at the School of Public Affairs at Pennsylvania State 
University, observes that al Qaeda has altered and adjusted 
its organizational philosophies in much the same way that 
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Colombian narcotics trafficking groups did after U.S. and 
Colombian law enforcement agencies rigorously pursued drug 
cartel leadership.240  Their similar modes of operation may 
be useful to U.S. and foreign law enforcement and 
counterterrorism units seeking to dismantle al Qaeda’s 
leadership and ultimately destroy its organizational 
foundation.  The main strategy for law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to stop cell-based and vertically-
organized terror groups and organized crime syndicates will 
demand much greater indigenous intelligence than currently 
exists, and a deeper understanding of personalities, 
protocols, culture, and organizational financing.  
Unfortunately, based on the past performance of U.S. 
programs devised to eradicate illegal drug trafficking the 
results to date do not predict a positive outcome for 
similar efforts to immobilize terror groups also involved 
in the drug trade. 
Leadership interdiction is another element that is 
clearly necessary in the prosecution of the narcoterrorist 
threat.  However, it is also an area where negative lessons 
can be extracted.  The most significant lesson learned by 
two decades of violent insurgency fuelled by the illicit 
drug trade in Colombia is that, according to Kenney,  
 [a] strategy premised on leadership interdiction 
runs the risk of merely weeding out the most 
notorious networks and providing opportunities 
for lesser known, but equally, if not more, 
sophisticated groups to materialize.241   
                     
240 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the 
War on Drugs, 192-196. 
241 Ibid., 188. 
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Moreover, the consequences that flowed from a 
preoccupation with eliminating the FARC’s leadership, as 
well drug trafficking kingpins, point to ways in which the 
current Mexican narcoterrorist threat might be more 
effectively confronted.242  
Turkey’s line of attack in dealing with the PKK’s 
campaign of terror, funded by its involvement in the 
illicit drug trade, also provides another example of where 
valuable lessons can be derived for prosecuting the current 
narcoterrorist threat.  The state’s hard-line, military 
approach, albeit heavy-handed, did eventually immobilize 
the PKK’s terrorist activities and dealt a fundamental blow 
to its structural hierarchy and morale with the arrest of 
its self-proclaimed leader, Abdullah Ocalan.  However, the 
government’s tough and often controversial response to the 
PKK’s narcoterrorist activities did not completely 
eliminate the threat to the state, as is evidenced today, 
with the vestiges of PKK leadership rallying the Kurdish 
war cry.  Nor did this response endear the Turkish state to 
its Kurdish minority.  Henri Barkey, Middle East and 
Eastern Mediterranean international relations scholar, 
aptly champions this point by affirming,  
While the PKK no longer constitutes the kind of 
military or political threat it did to Turkey in 
the 1990s, the return to armed attacks is a 
powerful reminder of things to come...after 
almost a century of efforts, Turkey is still 
struggling to come to grips with its Kurdish 
minority.243   
                     
242 Kenney, From Pablo to Osama, 188. 
243 Barkey, Turkey and the PKK: A Pyrric Victory? 343. 
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Eleven years after the downfall of Turkey’s longest 
Kurdish-inspired revolt, Ankara’s Kurdish question lingers 
largely unanswered.  A military solution to the 
narcoterrorist threat provides a short-term solution to a 
situation requiring a long-term, sustainable response.  
Diplomacy, conciliation and mediation are the first steps 
in the right direction of addressing internal negligence 
and strife, and Turkey is finally acknowledging this fact.  
However, a continued commitment to this effort is required 
if any progress is to be made in the future.  The same can 
be said of the current narcoterrorist crisis and civil 
unrest in Mexico. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As discussed throughout this thesis narcoterrorism is 
a multi-dimensional phenomenon as well as a pervasive 
threat to democratic regimes worldwide.  Successfully 
combating the trafficking of illegal drugs and its ties to 
transnational terror organizations requires a long-term 
commitment, well-organized agencies, and effective 
cooperation on the part of the U.S. government both on the 
domestic and international fronts.  Long-term commitments 
should consist of long-term plans, and should utilize 
organizations that are capable of carrying out these plans.  
These organizations should also be centralized under one 
principal agency chartered to lead the effort.  
Furthermore, international collaboration is a vital element 
in the struggle against the illicit drug trade.  Creating 
an international community that is sensitive to the issue 
and aware of the seriousness of the problem is the first 
prerequisite of this cooperative international effort.  
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Since drugs are a global dilemma, no single country can 
effectively combat the problem without the assistance of 
other nations.  This assistance should encompass numerous 
forms of mutual aid to include information exchange, 
financial support, joint operations, and international law 
and treaty reform designed to assist in targeting illicit 
drug trafficking networks.  This is not to say that these 
efforts are not currently underway in some shape or 
fashion; however, a more focused and concentrated effort 
needs to be undertaken as long as this clear and present 
danger continues to threaten not only America’s national 
security, but that of nations around the world. 
Terrorism, the second dimension of the narcoterrorism 
conundrum, requires the same commitments that are needed in 
the fight against illegal drug trafficking.  Effective 
international cooperation is vital to establish national 
and international security.  Terrorism becomes even more 
damaging when it is merged with illicit drug trafficking.  
Because of the huge financial gains associated with the 
illegal drug industry, terrorist organizations are given 
the opportunity to arm themselves with more sophisticated 
and lethal weapons, including nuclear and biological 
weapons of mass destruction.  To avoid the unimaginable 
consequences of such cataclysmic events, the ties between 
terrorist organizations and the sale of illegal drugs must 
be severed.  The best way of doing this is to completely 
eliminate both threats.  This, however, is not an easy 
undertaking and cannot be achieved in the short-term; it is 




immediate solution to this problem is to place renewed 
emphasis on severing the financial capacity of 
transnational terror networks. 
C. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
After researching the complex issues associated with 
the narcoterrorist nexus and examining its impact on such 
countries as Colombia and Turkey, I contend that the 
proposed thesis statement of this treatise is correct and 
highly plausible.  Narcoterrorism and its corrosive effects 
constitute a destructive and surreptitious assault on the 
United States and democratic nations spanning the globe.  
This phenomenon represents a threat to the security of not 
only the nations where it has taken root and that must 
suffer its devastating consequences but to the 
international community where it has risen to the forefront 
of global politics and continues to threaten worldwide 
stability.  How serious is the danger posed by the 
intersection of drugs and terrorism?  The same factors have 
already affected Colombia, and have destabilized Peru, 
Mexico, and Afghanistan, to name but a few.244  Ignoring the 
narcoterrorist threat and the ensuing corruption it 
propagates could engender dire consequences for the 
security of not only the United States but also of 
democratic nations around the world. 
The international nexus between drug trafficking and 
terrorism poses a significant and pervasive threat to U.S. 
national security and countermeasures to date have yet to 
decisively secure the U.S. homeland or interests abroad.  
                     
244 Hutchinson, Narco-Terror: The International Connection between 
Drugs and Terror. 
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One only need cast an eye down toward America’s Southern 
border to realize the all too destructive influence of the 
narcoterrorist connection.  Due to the ongoing struggle for 
power and supremacy among Mexico’s drug cartels, drug 
related deaths and violence near the U.S. and Mexican 
border are escalating with alarming regularity.  The threat 
of a spillover onto U.S. soil encumbers the crisis as an 
issue for homeland security.  
Until the United States comes to terms with the global 
nature of the threat, improves interagency cooperative 
efforts, and is willing to commit a steady stream of 
resources to the problem, terrorism, organized crime and by 
extension the illicit narcotics industry will continue to 
flourish for the foreseeable future.  Establishing 
effective security in the Hemisphere and keeping allies 
committed to the fight against terrorism and drug 
trafficking will require the U.S. to exercise continued 
vigilance and place increased emphasis on deterring this 
threat to homeland security and defense. 
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